113, 175, 795, 474

Ukraine RD1

[For information pertaining to Soviet policies in the Western Ukraine, particularly in regard to the Uniate Church and collectivization, see 26: Anonymous, R1 Soviet Union, Cat. 116.]

162 porizha 244 %, Kryvyj Rih 156.6 %, Staline 170 %, Konstanty-
361 nivka 233 %, towns in the Right and Left Bank areas decreased.

The increase in urban population in the Ukraine Soviet Republic is most probably due to foreign immigration. Housing has become worse practically everywhere; it is difficult to imagine that the immigrants can continue to live permanently under such wretched conditions.

● 474 The rural population was composed almost entirely of members of colkhoses. They possessed almost the entire agricultural land in common, all agricultural machinery and draught animals and much of the other livestock. There remained for personal use only small plots round the cottages, the cottages themselves and a few head of cattle (no horses), pigs and poultry.

474 Every member had to work on the soil of the colkhose. His
465 wages were reckoned according to the number of days he had worked and these were calculated according to time and kind of work performed. The amount of grain left after fulfilling obligations to the state and payment for hire of machines and tractors, seed, cattle-breeding expenses, rate of amortisation etc. represented the wages. They were paid in kind and (a smaller proportion) in money. This meant that variations in harvest yield were almost exclusively expressed by what was left for wages. In the first years of the colkhose system, members often received 2-3 kg of grain for a day's work; as their energy was not fully utilised in the colkhose and as the members of the family who were unable to work had also to live from these meager earnings, famine arose in the early thirties in Ukraine, bringing a great increase in the death-rate. Later, wages are said to have been raised but the Soviet statistics do not show whether the wages listed (15 kg and more per day) applied to entire Ukraine or to individual colkhoses. The incomes of the various colkhose members also varied, as administrative jobs were better paid than work in fields and stables, and as several members revealed "propriety instincts" for extending or exploiting their own small share at the expense of the common property.

175 The Peace of Riga (May 18th, 1921) between Poland and
728 Russia allocated to the former Volynia, Polesya and the district of Kholm, formerly parts of the Russian Empire, while the Ambassadors' Council on March 14th, 1923 added Galicia to Poland's gains. In the Treaty of Riga both partners promised to respect the rights of their minorities while the Ambassadors' Council declared that Poland was to issue laws that would preserve Ukrainian rights and that this was why the Entente Powers relegated their supreme authority to Poland. In reality, throughout the period of Polish supremacy there was little or no attempt to satisfy Ukrainian claims. The Ukrainian Chairs, established at Lviv University by Austria, ceased to exist and the law providing for a Ukrainian university was never implemented. Ukrainian schools were slowly but surely replaced by others where Polish was used either in some or in all classes. Polish became the language of instruction in secondary and vocational schools. The Ukrainian language was not recognised legally either in the administration or in law courts and Ukrainian influence declined in all selfgovernment organisations. Poles colonised Ukrainian areas. A campaign of public opposition was opened against the Ukrainian church: hundreds of churches were shut, above all in the district round Kholm, and the buildings were frequently burned.

175 The reaction of the Ukrainian population was considerable.
871 In the field of education steps were taken to organise private Ukrainian schools; thus in 1934-35 there were 21 Ukrainian secondary schools, 5 continuation vocational schools — mostly in the towns. This is no mean accomplishment in view of the Polish resistance. Besides actual schooling, Ukrainian youth outside of the schools was organised. In 1938 in Galicia alone the Ukrainian Union for Adult Education had half a million members, 84 branches, 3208 reading rooms, 2065 theatrical societies and 1105 choirs (the Union was forbidden by Polish Law outside
175 of Galicia). Cooperative stores also served to support Ukrainian
● 474 interests. In 1935 there were incorporated in the Ukrainian Central Cooperative Organisation 3013 cooperative societies with a membership of 541 508. This organisation of economic self-help had also to struggle against bitter Polish resistance, as expressed in the military pacification of Galicia in 1930 or the

pogroms in the autumn of 1938 when Ukrainian economic establishments and their equipment in towns in Eastern Galicia were almost completely demolished by the Polish mob. The Ukrainians who had been incorporated in Roumania had lived undisturbed under the Austrian Empire. In Bucovina there were Ukrainian elementary and secondary schools and a Ukrainian Chair at Chernivtsi University. The Ukrainian language was recognised in administration and law. Under Roumanian supremacy these rights were all forfeited and replaced by a policy of deliberate denationalisation. The only thing that Ukraine achieved during this period was the introduction of Ukrainian as an optional subject in some elementary schools. Officials who were not Roumanian nationals were dismissed without notice. 175 474 175

Ukrainian territory which belonged to the Czechoslovakian republic, so-called Carpathian Russia, although it was least significant in area and culture, enjoyed the greatest measure of freedom. It cannot, however, be said that Prague satisfied all the national claims of the Ukrainians.

231
433

Table 3. The Livestock in Ukraine (1912—1937) in Million of Head.

| | 1912 | 16 | 20 | 23 | 24 | 25 | 26 | 27 | 28 | 29 | 30 | 31 | 32 | 33 | 34 | 35 | 37 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| cattle | 6,5 | 7,7 | 6,8 | 7,1 | 8,3 | 8,9 | 8,4 | 8,4 | 8,6 | 7,6 | 6,3 | 6,2 | 5,0 | 4,4 | 5,3 | 6,3 | 7,8 |
| cows | 2,6 | 3,1 | 3,7 | 3,7 | 3,7 | 3,9 | 3,9 | 3,9 | 4,0 | 3,9 | 3,5 | 3,4 | 2,7 | 2,4 | 2,5 | 2,6 | 3,5 |
| horses | 5,6 | 5,5 | 3,9 | 3,8 | 4,0 | 4,3 | 4,6 | 5,1 | 5,5 | 5,6 | 5,3 | 4,8 | 3,7 | 2,6 | 2,5 | 2,6 | 3,5 |
| pigs | 4,1 | 4,6 | 5,3 | 2,4 | 4,2 | 3,7 | 3,7 | 4,4 | 7,0 | 4,2 | 3,2 | 3,4 | 2,6 | 2,1 | 4,2 | 4,7 | 7,7 |
| sheep | 6,2 | 6,4 | 6,9 | 8,4 | 9,3 | 9,7 | 8,7 | 8,0 | 8,1 | 7,0 | 4,5 | 3,4 | 2,1 | 2,0 | 2,2 | 2,8 | 3,3 |

In 1912 the number of horses was disproportionately high, viz., 7 millions. With the increasing use of motors, this number was reduced which, from the point of view of economy, was perfectly justifiable. Pig breeding, on the other hand, tended to increase, particularly in the north-west and the Kuban area. In spite of that, there were before World War I only 7.1 million pigs in the country, i. e. 4 % of world stock.

Sheep breeding has declined as a result of intensive management and competition from overseas on the world wool market, above all in fine wools.

Dnipro Ukraine statistics for the year 1916 provide characteristic material for judging the general development as well as the present position. Except for horses which had stopped increasing even before 1908, the figures for 1916 were only temporarily reached in the last year before the series of Five Year Plans. Diagrams 1 and 2).

[474] Collectivisation measures by the Soviets were a great blow to cattle rearing in Ukraine. Rather than hand over cattle to the State for nothing, the peasants slaughtered their stocks wholesale; and, as a result of bad treatment, epidemics and poor feeding, the cattle stocks of collective enterprises greatly declined. In 1933 the number of cattle and horses was only half what it had been in 1928 and pigs and sheep less than a quarter, while the entire stock had been reduced to 2/5, or 38 %. It was only after the colkhose peasants were allowed to keep cattle of their own, that numbers began slowly to rise, though they did not reach the level of 1928.

In Western Ukraine the development of stock-keeping was much more favorable, but the number for the whole of Ukraine was below prewar level, except in the case of pigs.

3: Mirchuk S-4 (no date) 1949 RDl Ukraine RDl

## Co-operative Organisations

The beginning of co-operative organisations in Dnipro-Ukraine and Western Ukraine date from the seventies and eighties of the 19th century. Foreign ideas and organisations supplied the model (especially English — Rochdale) e. g. the German foundations by Schulze — Delitzsch and Reiffeisen for credit co-operative societies. But they developed along other lines, their development being determined by legal and economic conditions which were nowhere the same — in the Russian Empire or Eastern Ukraine, in Austria-Hungary and the states which succeeded it and above all in Poland and therefore in Western Ukraine. In Dnipro-Ukraine the first co-operative society was founded in Kharkiv in 1866. The founder was M. Ballin, a landed proprietor and a man who was animated by co-operative ideals. He also wrote and was altogether a pioneer of the co-operative movement. Other co-operatives followed in the large towns but it was only after 1897 that general progress was marked when the statutes of a new co-operative society did not need to be approved by the Ministry of the Interior but only by the local governor. This is the time when Vasyl Domanytskyj, the Ukrainian champion of the co-operative movement wrote and worked.

Before World War I co-operative shops were the commonest co-operative organisation in Ukraine. Of the 6510 co-operative organisations in existence on January 1, 1914. 1075 (i. e. 47.2 %) were shops, while the 2370 co-operative credit societies were only 36.4 % of the total. Dnipro-Ukraine had 31 of all the co-operative shops in pre-war Russia (10080) while it had only 19 % of the co-operative credit societies (12995) and an average of only 22 % of all co-operative organisations (29060)

474 The formation of unions was difficult and made little progress till 1917.

452 Credit co-operative societies began in Dnipro-Ukraine in 1868 when the first Savings and Credit Society was founded in the town of Hadyach. Two years later Halahan, a big landed proprietor, founded a second in the village of Sokyryntsi and also in the Poltava district. The development of the movement was checked by the restrictions of Russian legislation. The state offered its support through the State Bank which in 1895 opened a special department as an office for the "control of small credit institutes". But the support of the state was not particularly effective and the very bureaucratic methods of control were not adapted to further a genuine co-operative spirit.

By the end of the century 295 organisations for savings and credit had been founded. And then a new form of credit co-operative society appeared. The law of 1895 had permitted the foundation of credit co-operatives without a capital that had first been paid in by members. The basic capital was credited by the State bank and had to be paid back gradually. This mutual loan type of bank appealed to the poor rural population. In 1897 the first Mutual Loan Bank in the whole empire was opened in the village of Ivankivtsi, in the district of Poltava. During the first year of the war 70 % of the credit co-operatives in Eastern Ukraine were of this new type.

Productive co-operative organisations found in Dnipro-Ukraine a new form in agricultural concerns. Since the middle of the nineties they had been founded and promoted by M. Levytskyj, their indefatigable champion and organiser. Each of these co-operative societies was based on a contract, according to which the land of the members was managed in common and the produce divided among the members or their families.

It would be wrong to conclude that the Ukrainian rural population inclined either to communism or to the colkhose form of farming. These societies were formed for concrete purposes and after these were attained and the members — not without the support of the patrons — had enlarged their holdings, the societies were dissolved. Most of the 125 rural productive co-operative societies founded after 1902 scarcely

lasted 2—3 years. A co-operative organisation was also formed in particular when land was to be purchased. 474 452

From 1906 on many productive co-operative societies were also founded in towns and they lasted much longer. World War I was favorable to their development (army orders etc.).

Legislation and administrative authorities in imperial Russia were opposed to the formation of co-operative unions. In 1909 the first union of credit co-operative societies on Ukrainian territories was founded in Berdianske, and this was followed up to the Revolution of 1917 by a few unions, though there was no central organisation.

Co-operative organisations in Eastern Ukraine before World War I were characterised by difficulties of development, especially wherever there was an attempt to extend the scope beyond purely local needs and by the lack of generous legislation. Prominent among the circumstances of that time was the distrust of governing circles against all forms of co-operation, no matter in what nation. The national point of view was therefore disregarded; it was indeed impossible for a national Ukrainian policy of economy to develop under the Tsars. But it was evident soon after the outbreak of the Revolution that strong national powers were behind the co-operative movement. 474

The Revolution and political independence gave a tremendous impulse to the co-operative movement in Ukraine. National and co-operative forces were closely interwoven. Numerous men of the people came from the ranks of the co-operative organisation to take responsible offices in the state; the Ukrainian state, which could not look for support to any national capitalist vested interests. found effective help in the co-operative organisations. In 1917 the "Dniprosojus" was founded as the central body of the Ukrainian co-operative stores and on January 1, 1919, it counted 80 unions with 8 000 co-operative stores and 540 similar organisations (these figures increased later to 200 and 14 000 respectively). The central body operated productive plants of its own, fulfilled cultural functions etc.

The "Ukrainbank" also first saw light in 1917 and on January 1, 1919, it united more than 130 unions with several thousand

●474 co-operative societies (in 1920 there were 175 unions). As the central body of the credit co-operative organisations, the Ukrainbank took over all paying and credit transactions, and for other co-operative organisations in Ukraine as well.

The "Central" was founded in January 1918 and formed the central organisation of the Ukrainian agricultural co-operative societies. Its functions were to assure the supply of agricultural machinery and other necessai, commodities, and, on the other hand, to organise the sale of agricultural produce and to increase agricultural production.

Besides these three most powerful central organisations, there were a number of special unions, the agricultural society for culture "Silskyj Hospodar", a central co-operative publishing concern etc.

In April 1919 the co-operative organisations could be summed up as follows: 7 central organisations, 120 unions of co-operative stores, 43 unions of credit co-operative societies, 7 of agricultural societies, 41 of mixed co-operative societies and 42 of other societies. In 1930 the 100 unions comprising approximately 40 000 co-operative societies and millions of members were finally dissolved, after having been re-organised on lines that were contrary to co-operative ideas.

In the Soviet state no real system of co-operation could exist and the movement soon declined. If any organisation still called itself a co-operative, it was in reality a state distribution agency without the slightest claim to independent activity and the spirit of co-operation. It would be wrong, too, to assume the existence of co-operative principles in collective managements.

In form, indeed, these ranked as "Artjel", that is to say as co-operative organisations. But they were communities formed by force, under the strict control of authorities, whose administration was equally rigid, but without the slightest trace of the spirit of co-operation.

A national system of economy could not stand up against a strongly centralised authority of state that was hostile to nationalities. In the last decades of imperial Russia, however, the national system found articulate expression and it received

a great impetus in the years of revolution and political independence. Under the Soviets it became an anomaly and perished not as a result of national competition or of a struggle with the economic forces of other nations but as the victim of a political power that is hostile to all popular movements, and that excluded all national or even co-operative independence. 474

The development of co-operative organisations in Galicia was most interesting from the point of view of national economy. The co-operative organisations in the main area of Western Ukraine which was poorer in national resources and agricultural production, as well as being smaller, were fewer and weaker than in Dnipro-Ukraine. And yet we cannot help remarking the priority of a national economy in purely co-operative ideas.

The Empire of Austria-Hungary was favorable towards the idea of co-operations so that these organisations had not, as in Russia, to fight for their development. And the state exercised no control. In Galicia the apparatus of local government was in the hand of the Poles. But they could not directly suppress Ukrainian economic organisations, even if they hampered their growth. Neither did post-war Poland adopt any positive attitude to co-operative organisations on principle. So Polish measures against Ukrainian co-operative societies were dictated by nationalism, though the state shrank from carrying them out to their logical conclusion, probably out of consideration for international opinion.

An atmosphere of national quarrels and strife against a stronger opponent was therefore characteristic for Ukrainian economic effort in Galicia; this opponent had indeed state authority but was not so overwhelmingly powerful as to hold up the Ukrainian economic and co-operative movement.

The poverty of the peasant population could be relieved only by disinterested activity on the part of educated circles and by the organisation of even the most modest economic forces; big estates and natural wealth were both in the hands of for-

474 eigners. Circles round the "Prosvita", a society concerned with the culture and education of the people and later also with economics, were mainly responsible for the work of spreading economic ideas and forming organisations. This activity increased in intensity after the first national meeting of the Ukrainians in Lviv (1880).

After conducting a public campaign the "Prosvita" proceeded to further and found credit societies, grain silos, stores and trading societies. It also functioned through travelling teachers and courses, it granted bursaries for the study of economics abroad, founded vocational schools, experimental farms etc.

But amalgamation in a universal organisation at that time had also disadvantages for economic development. And as organisations the economic societies were not the most suitable. It was only when co-operative societies were founded that national economic efforts found their final and best form of organisation.

462 Individual credit co-operative societies appeared as early as
474 1873, when the "Vira", the first credit co-operative society, was established in Tysmenytsia (it still exists to-day); but the growth of a sound system was not assured till the central body was organised in Lviv in 1898. At the end of 1911 this union comprised 320 credit co-operative societies, while about 100 were not members of the union. The local government erected an organisation which comprised 723 loan banks, 184 of which were Ukrainian. But this organisation was developed along Polish lines and was never of great significance for the development of a Ukrainian economic system.

It was typical for this "classical home of usury" in the years before the war that the credit co-operative societies far exceeded all other such organisations. After the first World War the central body founded in Lviv in 1898 was called "Centrobank" But credit co-operative organisations had to yield their priority of place to agricultural trading or productive co-operative organisations.

Co-operative stores grew slowly in the towns where there were few Ukrainians. The powerful co-operative founded in Lviv in 1883, the "Narodna Torhovla" assumed the functions of a central organisation in 1907, for all stores. After the first World War, however, it concentrated more and more on the towns and on certain merchandise. Co-operative dairies go back to the local units erected by the "Prosvita". In 1905 a union of dairy co-operatives was organised in Stryj. After the first World War the "Maslosojuz" flourished and became a model, not only of co-operative but also of national economic management. It was far superior to the Polish unions with their large subsidies and even exported butter. 474

Agricultural co-operative societies were amalgamated in the union "Silskyj Hospodar" which was transformed in 1909 in Lviv from the former union for commerce and trade in Peremyshl (1899). After the first World War the re-organised union, under the name of "Centrosojuz" received fresh life and supplied village and district co-operatives, partly with the products of their own co-operative industrial societies, organising the sale and the purchase of grain, cattle, bacon, poultry and especially of eggs, partly exporting them. Its turnover increased in 4 years from 1933—37 by almost 300 %.

Other co-operative societies include above all the insurance society "Dnister" (1891) in Lviv (since 1895 also a co-operative bank). The co-operative bank for trade and industry, the "Prombank" is also worthy of mention. It owed its foundation to the first meeting of Ukrainian engineers (Lviv 1932) and its development was promising. Ukrainian co-operative societies in Galicia are united, both as regards practice and theory, in the "Revision Union of Ukrainian Co-operative Societies". It was founded in accordance with the special Austrian Law of 1903 dealing with co-operative societies (the general law having been passed in 1873) in the next year in Lviv and in 1911 comprised 511 co-operative societies. After the first World War it extended its scope to Volynia, Polesya, Podlakhia and the Kholm district. But these areas as well as the Galician country of the Lemky were withdrawn from it in 1932 and attached to Polish unions.

● 474 Ukrainian co-operatives in Galicia in 1938 were as follows: Credit co-operatives: 688 (20 % of the entire number, in 1911 60 %), Co-operative stores 126 (not quite 4 %);

Purely dairy co-operatives 143 (more than 4 %), to which, however, must be added the agricultural co-operatives with dairy departments (119 in 1937).

Agricultural co-operatives 2350 (68 %).
Others 16.

Co-operatives of first rank 3423, of second and third (unions) 32.
Members in 1937 = 643 000.

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RDI Ukraine RDI



665 178 191 were to be modernized, and the construction of the great power station of Dnieprostroy was in view. Thousands of engineers, technicians and specialized workers were being sent into the Ukraine and these people not only had no knowledge of the Ukrainian dialect but they found that dialect most inappropriate for correspondence between different Government departments on complicated technical questions. The intensified industrialization of the Ukraine was obviously destined to strengthen greatly all connections with the north and linguistic differences gave promise of frequent and annoying difficulties. Very soon the Ukrainian language came only to be used in the sphere of 'cultural relations'.

Meanwhile Kaganovich, in surveying the various aspects of 'ukrainization', began gradually to investigate the part played in different branches of the administration by 'Ukrainian nationalists' or those suspected of being such.

## §7. 'THE REVOLUTION AGAINST THE PEASANTS': REPRESSION OF UKRAINIAN NATIONALISM

665 423 In 1929 the Communist Revolution was approaching its second and decisive stage: Marxist principles which had conquered the life of the cities were to be imposed on the countryside. But the process of 'collectivizing' agriculture was to prove even more difficult in the Ukraine than it was in the provinces of Great Russia. Individual property in land had always been traditional in the Ukraine, and the background of the social history of the country had been the unending struggle of the peasantry to maintain their right to own the land they worked—against Polish landlords and Cossack and, later, Great Russian landlords. The strength of the Ukrainian peasantry had always been their stubborn determination that each should own his plot of land, and their weakness had been a love of individual freedom degenerating often enough into libertarian anarchy.

423 ● 474 The outlook of the Ukrainian peasant differed widely from that of the Great Russian. The *obshchina*—the old Russian form of possessing (but not of working) land collectively—was unknown in the regions of Chernigov and Poltava and in all right-bank Ukraine. The creation of *kolkhozy* (collective farms) was from the beginning opposed, generally passively and sometimes actively, by the peasantry. And Kaganovich hastened, so soon as peasant opposition developed, to deprive the Ukrainians of the weapon which the national idea might provide. (In Caucasia and Turkestan, during the same period, opposition to collectivization was combined with a renascence and strengthening of local nationalist movements directed

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1



against the Great Russian hegemony.) The Ukrainian enthusiasts of 423
'cultural acheivements' so recently lauded by Kaganovich himself 474
were now accused of 'maintaining relations with nationalist political organizations in Galicia'. And it was not difficult to prove their connections with open or secret organizations 'suffering under the yoke of Poland'. The existence of such connections had been tolerated and even favoured by the Soviet administration to the extent which they furthered Communist propagandist activities in Poland, but there could be no difficulty, if necessary, in treating them as treason.

In 1930 the first Ukrainian political trial took place in Kharkov. 668
A group of individuals were accused of having relations with 'the 674
Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine'—the same organization 661
which had been created before the war under the protection of the Austro-Hungarian Government and which was now supposed to be functioning in Galicia. In the following year, as a result of the growing resistance of the peasants to collectivization, action against Ukrainian 'suspects' became more violent. The peasants were bitterly opposed to the *kolkhozy*, but certainly not on 'national' grounds. Faced with the imminent danger of a peasant revolt, the Soviet administration decided to eliminate all persons who through their origins could be considered to be connected with the peasantry and who might organize this revolt and become its leaders. Regardless of their loyalty to the Soviet régime during the preceding years, there now began a systematic destruction of Ukrainians belonging to the 'intelligentsia' and 'half-intelligentsia'.

In 1931 the Bolsheviks professed to have 'discovered' a Ukrainian 661
organization called 'the National Centre'. Holubovich (former 687
head of the *Rada* Government and participator in the Brest-Litovsk negotiations), Shershel, Mazurenko and other 'ex-politicians' were accused of being the leaders of this secret organization. They were shot. Thousands of arrests followed, the victims of which suffered execution or exile to labour camps which were themselves living cemeteries. Two years later, in 1933, the political police (G.P.U.) declared that they had discovered a real military conspiracy on the part of 'a secret military organization'. After a theatrical trial, Kotsubinsky (Vice-President of the Ukrainian Council of People's Commissars), Kovnar (Commissar for Agriculture), and scores of other persons who had all occupied important posts in the army or the administration were shot. One of the most prominent figures in Ukrainian political life, who from the beginning had associated himself with the Communist Revolution and who had for a long time been an influential member of the Council of People's Com-

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1



the second was to crush the will of the peasantry. In the first he succeeded as best he could and added to the sensational trials of 1931–3 the discovery of 'a secret Ukrainian organization' which was accused of being in direct touch with the Ukrainian separatists who were working abroad under the leadership of Colonel Konovalets. It was, however, beyond the strength of Postyshev to cope with the chaos which reigned in rural Ukraine during the years 1932–4 as a result of the policy of forced collectivization. Despite the fact that Postyshev 'eliminated' from the Ukrainian Communist Party over a quarter of its total strength, and in spite of thousands of arrests and hundreds of executions, the Party Secretary was accused of 'weakness and lack of energy' and was replaced by a certain Kossior. The late 'dictator' was, after a lapse of time, himself arrested and probably shot together with many of his closest collaborators.

But all the cruel personal dramas which took place under the Secretaryships of Postyshev and Kossior were as nothing compared to the terrible miseries which overtook the Ukrainian countryside during the five years 1930–35 as a result of the introduction of the *kolkhozy*. In their very essence *kolkhozy* were organically opposed to all the traditions and ways of life of the Ukrainian peasantry. Collective farming on a large scale was carried through at the cost of ruining small and 'average' peasant farms through the instrument of the ruthless pressure of the administration. The very rapid development of 'the *kolkhoz* movement' so much admired by Communists all the world over was the result, not of the peasants voluntarily joining the collective farms, but of their being driven on to them often by the use of military force—a fact which Stalin himself acknowledged in his article 'Head-turning from Success' (*Pravda*, 2 March 1930). The immediate consequence of the *kolkhoz* policy was seen in the lowering of agricultural production throughout the whole country which quickly led to the increasing misery of the peasantry, famine and terrible mortality. One of the principal reasons of all this was the *mania grandiosa* which always characterizes the policy of extreme ideologues; having become convinced of the low productive capacity of the smaller *kolkhozy* already set up, the enthusiasts of the Communist Party, in 1930, demanded their enlargement on a 'gigantic' scale. According to the reliable testimony of a member of the Communist Party (the Ukrainian agronomist Mirkevich, the initiator of tractor stations) 'this measure, in a series of regions, was realized in an exceptionally bureaucratic and senseless manner. *Kolkhozy* of 55–100 hectares were suddenly transformed, without any adequate technical preparation, into

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*kolkhozy* covering some tens of thousands of hectares; as, for instance, the *Kolkhoz* of "Chervony Perekop" in the Government of Kherson which was set up to comprise 50,000 hectares. In some cases, "to simplify matters", a whole region containing hundreds of villages was declared to constitute one *kolkhoz*. All the boundaries between village lands were abolished; then the whole expanse of land arbitrarily included in the *kolkhoz* was divided into farms of several thousand hectares each—without any regard as to where the villages actually lay. Cattle and agricultural machinery were scattered about over scores of kilometres' (*Pravda*, 3 April 1930).

Nevertheless Stalin declared that: 'The time has come to finish with every kind of camouflage: we must destroy the *kulaks* and deprive them of the possibility to work on the land.' At that moment anyone who owned three cows or the equivalent in sheep, pigs, or even chickens, was considered to be a *kulak*. As a result of this policy it was not long before all the larger and more prosperous peasant farms were destroyed. These farms, since the disappearance of the large private estates, had been the principal producers of the agricultural surplus, since it was only the better-off farmers who had a surplus in excess of their needs for disposal in the towns.

As early as 1930 the policy of forced collectivization provoked open resistance in the Ukraine, and attempts were made at armed revolt; but geographical conditions did not favour the type of guerilla warfare which was undertaken with considerable determination and success by the peasants in Georgia, and particularly in the Armenian district of Karabagh and by the Tartars of the Daghestan foothills. These agrarian risings in the Ukraine were suppressed with the greatest cruelty and were followed by mass executions and by the transportation of tens of thousands of peasants. The Soviets applied methods which were then almost new in their struggle with the Ukrainian peasantry; they put them into concentration camps where they had to do forced labour. In the region of Odessa, near Tiraspol, a large and prosperous colony of 'Old Believers' completely disappeared. All the men, with the exception of a few youngsters who managed to cross the Dniestr into Bessarabia, were transported, and the women and children simply scattered over the steppe. The construction of the White Sea Canal, so much advertised by the admirers of Soviet methods in Western Europe, cost the lives of many tens of thousands of peasants, as the vast cemeteries along the banks of the northern lakes and rivers bear witness.

Very often the prospect of transportation to the far north or to Siberia caused the peasants, as in old time, to abandon everything

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and to wander off into the steppe 'where the eyes look'. Until the Bolsheviks erected barbed wire all along the frontier, the Volhynian peasants used to cross the Polish border in large bodies with their women and children and cattle—sometimes a thousand strong and more—with the merciless detachments of the G.P.U. hot in pursuit, held off by an armed rear-guard. According to reports appearing in the Polish Press in 1932 great numbers of these fugitive peasants were held in quarantine camps in Poland. At the same time gangs of fugitives from Central Russia and the Ukraine made their way into Transcaucasia under the leadership of ex-soldiers; conditions here, where a struggle against forced collectivization was also in progress, were little better than in the Ukraine, and large numbers, Russians and Tartars and Tats from the Talish region, forced their way across the Araks frontier into the northern provinces of Iran.

The abolition of small and 'average' farming, the disorganization in the newly formed *kolkhozy*, the passive resistance of the peasants, and the bestial brutality of the methods which accompanied the enforcement of the new system, brought about the famine of 1932–3. The first news of famine in the Ukraine came from the Polish frontier in the autumn of 1932. It became known that domestic animals were perishing wholesale and that the mortality among the population was enormous. Already, even in the summer, there was no more bread in the Ukraine. Millions of human beings were set in motion. Part of these great crowds infested the towns in the hope of being able to survive until the next harvest. But the main flow of movement was directed towards the northern Caucasus, the regions beyond the Volga, Siberia and Turkestan. In many districts only the old people remained where they were in the hope of somehow surviving on potatoes. There were wide districts which were almost completely abandoned by the population. Whole villages went to ruin, and the once prosperous gardens and fields were abandoned to weeds.

Early in 1933, before the time of spring sowing, orders were issued to drive back the migrant hordes by force to their villages. Great numbers of peasants who were arrested and coralled in camps died because they were not fed. Those who returned to their lands, sick and hungry, found that they had to set to work with spades and staves because only about a fifth part of the horses remained and most of these were too weak to work. A particular foreign correspondent who obtained permission to travel in the regions of Kiev, Chernigov, Kharkov and Poltava in the autumn of 1933, affirms that, according to statements which were made to him in the offices of the local administrations, about 10 per cent of the population of

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and the Middle East have been left in suspense, a territory the size of Europe and new routes into the heart of China and ultimately to the Pacific have been brought under Soviet control. Under these circumstances 'the wheat-fields of the Ukraine' receded again into the background and became of only local importance: the more so since, in the two Soviet 'Economic Plans', interest in South-Eastern Russia has been concentrated on the industrial development of the New Russian region. These conditions are illustrated by the growth of industrial centres like Kharkov, Ekaterinoslav, Lugansk, Zaporozhie, and the decline of the great grain port of Odessa.

The agricultural wealth of the Ukraine has never in fact justified the enthusiasm which it has inspired from the time of the seventeenth-century Polish poet quoted in an earlier context to the more recent period of Herr Hitler and his apostles of *Lebensraum*. The natural conditions of the Ukraine are such that they really generously reward agricultural labour, but they exact always patient, strenuous and systematic toil.

Natural conditions differ greatly over the expanse of the country which Michael Dragomanov considered to constitute 'Greater Ukraine'. The agricultural 'age' of these territories differs in the extreme. In New Russia agriculture is only a century old, while Galicia has supported a numerous population of husbandmen for nearly a thousand years.

*Galicia* is one of the oldest agricultural lands of all Europe and conditions there have hardly altered since the days of Daniel and his *boyars*. The Galician earth, black in the eastern part, is tired old soil, impoverished by incessant labour, itself prompted and intensified by the ever-growing care of an ever-growing population to acquire its daily bread. Owing to the density of the population (110, and in some regions 132, inhabitants to the square kilometre) the area of holdings had been reduced to a minimum: 46 per cent of the farms comprise 2 hectares of land and sometimes less; 37 per cent comprise from 2 to 5 hectares. In a countryside where urban life has remained relatively stagnant live 75 per cent of the total population; while all commerce and crafts remain in the hands of the Jews in the large towns and in many of the villages, there is a 50 per cent surplus of hands among agricultural labourers. The peasants, Poles and Ukrainians alike, used to migrate to Germany and France as casual labour; before the last war they emigrated also in large numbers to Canada and the United States.

These arduous conditions of peasant life gradually developed a capacity for organization. Driven by necessity, the Galician peasantry set up a network of co-operatives for production and

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distribution. These co-operatives formed the basis of a certain national unity which found expression in the political field.

*Volhynia*, partitioned after the war of 1920 between the Poles and the Soviets, is nearly as old an agricultural country as Galicia. Here the strips of rich black earth alternate with sandy and wooded country. Although density of population is not so great as in Galicia, poverty is perhaps even greater, owing to a lack of that capacity for organization which helps the Galician labourers to survive. The large estates of the Polish nobility have long disappeared; after the last war the Polish Government divided up the land. Numerous strips were allotted to Polish soldiers on the expiration of their service—with the intention of strengthening the Polish ethnic and cultural element in the region. The disappearance of the large estates, as in Transylvania and Roumania, had a deleterious effect on agricultural production and on the proper exploitation of the forests. The majority of the people lead a half-starved existence, and the young men dream of emigration to South America. In 1937, 25 per cent of the population of Polish Volhynia had neither bread nor wood.

*Podolia* has been a land of cultivation since the Middle Ages, although the soil was broken up two or three hundred years later than in Galicia and Volhynia. Now, as before the period of war and revolution (1914–20), Podolia remains in a close economic relationship to the other parts of the Ukraine. The black earth of this favoured province is really fruitful and well watered by numerous small rivers; climatic conditions are better than anywhere throughout the Ukraine—rain is plentiful and regular and the winters are short. It was probably the fields and pastures, the hillocks and woods of Podolia which the Polish poet had in mind when he wrote lyrically of 'the birthplace of Ceres and Diana'. Horticulture and apiculture have long flourished there.

In the past social conditions varied with the political situation according to whether the small landowners (Ukrainian Cossacks) or the Polish landlords were in the ascendant. During the eighteenth century Polish elements had the upper hand and for some time Podolia remained the last refuge of the Polish aristocracy. Polish social influences survived the Three Partitions, and it was only after the Polish Insurrection of 1830 that conditions began to change in favour of the Russian majority in the population.

Towards the middle of the nineteenth century this rich land with its soft climate had become very densely populated. By the end of the century Podolia ranked second in density of population of all the regions of the Russian Empire. The Government of Moscow took

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## §2. SOVIET AGRICULTURAL POLICY

The late Alexander Guchkov used to say that 'the social revolution begun by Lenin in 1917 was carried through during the following twelve years in the towns and industrial centres only. It did not profoundly affect the countryside until 1929.' Just for this reason Stalin in that ominous year undertook what was to amount to a second and more fundamental revolution in the life of the peoples of Russia.

The condition of the peasantry had so far improved during the years 1922–29 that the Communist régime was able to realize that the peasant was fast becoming the principal and most formidable adversary of the Marxist Revolution. An implacable struggle was therefore initiated against that enemy who had succeeded in recuperating in the social and economic sense, but who was not yet ready to enter the field as an organized political force contending for mastery with a Communist Party which derived its power from the support of the industrial proletariat.

The economic Five Year Plans elaborated by the Soviet régime were dictated by the necessity of reconstructing the social and economic structure of the country in a way which should correspond with the bases of state which the continuance of the political dictatorship of the Communist Party required.

'The main idea of the Soviet Five Year Plans was the accelerated industrialization of U.S.S.R. and, parallel with it in accordance with the political needs of the régime, a rapid collectivization of agriculture. It was always for political rather than for economic reasons that the New Economic Policy, which the Communists had been obliged to put into practice since 1922, was abolished in 1929. The Communist Party, under the leadership of Stalin, proceeded to a new experiment in collectivism in the countryside, using in this case unusually brutal and inhuman methods which completely ruined all more or less prosperous farmers. The peasantry were unable to offer any effective resistance to the authorities, since their risings were only scattered and isolated in character. The peasants chose instinctively the easier way of passive resistance which found expression in the contraction of production and in the careless and unsatisfactory operation of the first collective farms (*Kolkhozy*). As a result of the policy of the Communist Party and of the natural reaction of the peasantry, the country had again to endure a frightful famine which bore its worst aspect in those regions where the percentage of collectivized farms was greatest' (Markov).

The Party had finally triumphed over the peasantry by the end of

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1934, and in January of the following year it proclaimed its political and social victory. Reference has been made in the preceding chapter to the social upheaval, the great losses in human life and the redistribution of population incurred during the 'Revolution against the Peasants'. Losses in natural wealth were also formidable: during the five years, 1929–34, horses declined by 50 per cent; cattle by 40 per cent; only about half the total number of pigs survived and one-quarter of the sheep.

The first efforts of the Soviet administration had been directed to the organization of *Sovkhozy*—the large Government farms which in effect replaced the 'capitalist' private estates of the pre-Revolutionary period. Grain, beet sugar and stock-raising *Sovkhozy* were set up. In 1934 there were already 10,500 of them, of which 1665 were situated in the Ukraine and New Russia. In 1935 the sown area of the *Sovkhozy* attained 15 million hectares as against 2 million in 1929 (i.e. 10 per cent as against 2 per cent of the whole sown area of the Union). Livestock confiscated from the peasantry stocked these 'model' farms, which soon began to evoke the admiration of urban tourists from the West. The *Sovkhozy* were well supplied with the most modern agricultural machinery: in spite or because of this fact they failed to absorb any large proportion of the rural labour which had been deprived of normal occupation by the new measures. In 1931 only 1½ million people throughout the whole stretch of the Union were employed on *Sovkhozy*: in 1934 nearly 3 million were employed (of which 1½ million were in Ukraine and New Russia).

The *Kolkhozy* proved to be a far more important factor in the new agricultural economy. Between 1929 and 1934 all means—including the most ruthless—were employed to force the peasants on to the collective farms. The number of *Kolkhozy* grew rapidly: in July 1930 only 23 per cent of all farms had been converted into *Kolkhozy*; by the beginning of 1932 the figure was already 60 per cent; by the beginning of 1934 it had reached 72 per cent; and in 1936, 90 per cent. During the last three years individual farmers in U.S.S.R. have almost completely disappeared: the sown area occupied by private farmers amounted to 34 per cent in 1934 and to only 4 per cent in 1936.

As a result of the widespread famine conditions and the really serious insurrections which had troubled the authorities in the Northern Caucasus and Trans-Caucasia during the period 1930–32, and as a result also of the deterioration in the international situation which followed the Nazi rise to power in Germany in 1934, the Soviet Government, in spite of its proclaimed 'victory', found itself forced to modify the principles on which rural collectivization

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had been based. '"Liberal" tendencies began already in 1932 in the sense that *kolkhozniki* (individual members of the *Kolkhozy*) were allowed to keep their own cattle (Decree of 4 February 1932). Subsequently, in 1935, *kolkhozniki* were accorded the right to farm their own private allotments within the boundaries of the *Kolkhozy*.

These modifications in policy soon gave positive results. It is difficult to say whether the *Kolkhozy* have come to be accepted by the peasantry as the permanent basis of rural life. At the same time there can be no doubt that the grant of certain rights of private farming to the *kolkhozniki*, combined with a relatively free market, has tended to a notable improvement in the conditions of peasant life. In consequence food production throughout the whole country has again increased.

There are now four forms of farming in existence side by side in the Soviet countryside:

(*a*) *Sovkhozy* (State farms);
(*b*) Individual farms;
(*c*) *Kolkhozy* (Collective farms);
(*d*) Allotments belonging to the *kolkhozniki* within the area of the *Kolkhozy*.

The relative importance of these different types of farm can be judged from the areas allotted to each in the 'sowing plan' of 1936: *Sovkhozy* covered 16 million hectares; individual farms, 5 million; *Kolkhozy*, 108 million; *kolkhozniki* holdings, 8 million.

Obviously, the *Kolkhozy* constitute the most important source of agricultural production. On an estimated yield of 8·3 quintals per hectare, the *Kolkhoz* pays 1·7 quintals to the state in taxes; 3·3 to the governmental 'machine stations' which provide and maintain plant; the balance goes to the *kolkhozniki*. The *Kolkhozy*, with a sowing area of rather over 100 million hectares and a yield of 7 quintals per hectare, supply the state organizations with about 150 million quintals (approximately 15 million tons) surplus over the consumption of the rural population. This reckoning is, of course, purely theoretical, but, in 1934, when bread rations existed for the town population, the administration did distribute about 10 million tons of bread.

The importance of the *kolkhozniki* (who are allowed to cultivate from ¼ hectare to 1 hectare each) lies in the production of vegetables and fruit and, to a certain extent, of livestock. The Plan for 1937 estimated that individual farmers and *kolkhozniki* possessed 29 million head of cattle as compared with 4½ million owned by the *Kolkhozy* over their vastly greater acreage. The private farmers and

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It is important to ascertain the number of Ukrainians who remain in the territory of S.S.R. Ukraine. According to Soviet statistics the urban population, amounting to 8,000,000, numbers only 30 per cent of Ukrainians. Among the rural population Ukrainians are in a majority, though they are not everywhere equally distributed: in some regions there are over 80 per cent; in others (like Odessa) 60 per cent; in the Donets rural areas a little over 50 per cent. In 1926, during the period of 'ukrainization' encouraged by the Government, 24,000,000 out of 30,000,000 registered as Ukrainians, but even 15 per cent of these 'native' Ukrainians gave their mother tongue as Russian. Since that date catastrophes have befallen the rural folk of the Ukraine: about 3,000,000 are reckoned to have perished during the famine of the early thirties, and another 2,000,000 certainly have migrated as a result of conditions which they found intolerable. These losses have not been wholly replaced by natural increase, and there is every reason to think that the number of 'native' Ukrainians in the rural population of the Republic has decreased since 1930 by at least 4,000,000. If at that time the number of persons speaking Ukrainian and considering themselves to be Ukrainians amounted to 20,000,000, there can scarcely be more than 16,000,000 peasants left now. If to these are added the number of Ukrainians living in the towns, the total probably amounts to about 18,000,000. In other words, the Ukrainian population of Soviet Ukraine (before the incorporation of Eastern Galicia) amounted to little more than half of the total population.

This figure is eloquent: the Soviet Government has gone a long way to achieve the result towards which its policy was directed, and in the Ukrainian S.S.R. Ukrainians can no longer be considered to be in a great majority. It follows therefore that nearly half the population (16,000,000 to 17,000,000) are not Ukrainians. Among these alien elements a little less than 2,000,000 are Jews; about 1,000,000 are Moldavians; another million belong to different nationalities—White Russians, Poles, Greeks, Germans. The remaining 12,000,000 to 13,000,000 consist either of people born in the Ukraine who do not wish to consider themselves Ukrainians or of 'new-comers' from other parts of the Union. The number of these 'new-comers' must amount to 8,000,000 to 9,000,000.

It is notable that in the last years (since 1930) the Government has used every means to encourage the settlement of these 'new-comers' not only in the industrial areas but also in the purely rural districts. It is obvious that Moscow does not desire vast rural areas with an entirely homogeneous Ukrainian population. The Government prefers groups of *Kolkhozy* on Ukrainian territory to be constituted on the mosaic principle. Each year, from all the Military Districts of the Soviet Union, soldiers who have finished their military service and who have sent in petitions that on account of lack of land they do not wish to return to their original homes are drafted to the new Red Army *Kolkhozy*. These *Kolkhozy*, recruited from the variety of nationalities throughout the Union, are being scattered over some of the best land of the Ukrainian countryside. In some regions there are as many as ten of these military collectivized farms. Reference has already been made to the measures taken by the Government against the bourgeois *kolkhozniki* during the summer of 1939. A new 'movement' of the population is in view in

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U.S.S.R., and there is no doubt that one of the results will be a further weakening of Ukrainian elements where the Government considers them to be still too strong

*Secondary Branches of Ukrainian Agriculture*

In addition to wheat, *rye*, *barley*, *oat* and *maize* crops are important. *Millet* is also grown and forms the base of the broth (*psheno*) which is a favourite dish in the South of Russia (in the North this broth or porridge is made from buck-wheat).

*Clover* and *lucerne* are comparatively little cultivated, and almost exclusively in right-bank Ukraine and Galicia.

About a million hectares are under *potatoes* in right-bank Ukraine; the bulk of the crop goes to the alcohol distilleries.

*Sunflower-seed* is important in the production of oil; *hemp* and small quantities of *linseed* and *mustard-seed* are produced for the same purpose.

The cultivation of *hops* was always traditional in Volhynia; in pre-Revolutionary days half of the hop production of the Empire came from Volhynia and right-bank Ukraine. In late years production has greatly declined.

*Tobacco*, the cultivation of which was introduced by Greek immigrants in the eighteenth century, is a speciality of the districts of Nezhin and Romen. The quality is not good and the cultivation of tobacco has no future in the Ukraine.

Particularly in Podolia and the region of Uman, *kolkhozniki* take great interest in horticulture; about 200,000 hectares are under orchards. On many *Kolkhozy* the *kolkhozniki* occupy themselves on the private cultivation of *tomatoes*, and the Government has set up canning plants in order to encourage this branch of production.

The *vine* grows well on the banks of the Dniepr and the southern Bug, in the neighbourhood of Berdyansk and Odessa, and along the Dniestr. But wine production has not been developed on the scale which it has attained in Bessarabia and the Crimea.

The Soviet Government favours agricultural experiments, and some *Kolkhozy* in the South have tried to cultivate *rice*—so far with little success.

An experiment on a large scale was made in the cultivation of *cotton*. 190,000 hectares between the mouth of the Dniepr and Perekop were reserved, but it is not likely that cotton cultivation in the Ukraine will prove the success which it has in the more suitable climates of Azerbaijan and Turkestan.

*Secondary Mineral Resources in the Ukraine*

Reserves of different qualities of *lignite* are distributed over many parts of the Ukraine. In view of the abundance of other resources of calorific power, exploitation has not been greatly developed, but output of lignite in the region of Elizavetgrad attains 300,000 tons a year.

A million tons of *peat* is cut annually in Ukraine—about 10 per cent of the output of U.S.S.R.

*Bauxites* in the Dniepr region are utilized for the Aluminium Works near Dnieprostroy.

185 The peasants also revived and breathed new life into the co-
● 474 operatives which had been broken up during the period of Militant
241 Communism. In 1923 they established another cooperative organization, the Selo-Tekhnyka (Village Machines) which purchased more expensive agricultural machinery and rented it out to the peasants for the appropriate agricultural work. These points became the centre of mechanization and were in effect the first
[453] tractor stations. In 1924 they established the First Agricultural Bank, a sort of private institution which at one time had more loans outstanding than had the Ukrainian State Bank which was, of course, closely supervised by Moscow.

185 All these efforts met with marked success and agriculture
369 speedily began to revive. The peasants became more prosperous and their holdings of livestock rapidly increased, although they did not reach the pre-war level. This, in its turn, created a new demand for manufactured products and restored the factories to operation, and with them the conditions in the cities began to improve.

185 Similar concessions were made to industry, but with one im-
471 portant difference. The larger and more important industrial
[475] plants were not turned back to their former owners who were, as before, allowed no voice or influence in their direction. They were taken from the workers who had seized and abused them during the period of Militant Communism and placed under the supervision of government trusts. These were either regional in character or confined to a single branch of industry. In either case, they were under the control of a more or less trusted group of men among whom Communists were in the leading positions, but while they received certain credits from the state, they were more or less autonomous and they were allowed to go through regular commercial transactions and encouraged to show profits in their annual reports. There was thus again a source of encouragement both for the directors and the workers, and slowly but surely the level of industry began to rise.

The smaller plants were very often leased to individuals who were allowed to employ hired labor and the hope was given to these that their taxes would be at such a level that they, too, could

* [NEP attempts to restore peasant prosperity -- Analyst]

Once this was decided, the way was open for the establishment of the First Five Year Plan which was frankly drawn up so entirely in the central offices that the local Commissariats of the different republics ceased to have their former significance in the state and became, for the most part, mere subsidiaries to be watched and checked at every turn or at every manifestation of a tendency toward independence.

There was no longer any talk of the independence of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic with its powers to maintain diplomatic representatives abroad or with the pretense that it was handling its own affairs under the guidance of the All-Union Communist Party. The role of the Russian element in the state kept on increasing and once more it was possible to revive the old arguments as to the need for definite russification.

It was relatively a simple matter for the government to administer industry as it wished. It had retained control throughout the period of the New Economic Policy of the leading factories and industrial enterprises and the workers had been deprived of any of the rights which they might have imagined themselves possessed when they took over the plants. They were by now completely dependent for their conditions of work and for their employment on the whims of the plant managers who were themselves directly under the central authorities in Moscow. The government built new plants where and as it wished and was not bound to consult any one as to its purposes and measures.

The peasants were less tractable, for especially in Ukraine they still felt themselves the masters of their own fate. The new philosophy looked upon them, too, as the servants of the state and determined to collectivize them in one way or another and to force them into collective farms, whether they wished it or not.

In this process the first step was to break the peasant power of resistance and the regime saw clearly that this was based upon the financial power of the richer and the middle peasants. Whereas Lenin and the earlier Soviet regime in Ukraine had grouped together the middle and the poor peasants and had supported them against the richer peasants and the large landowners, the

[1927 - Stalin made Party and Government synonymous -- Analyst]

423 policy was now changed and the middle and the richer peasants
474 were grouped together and opposed to the poor peasants. This
661 multiplied enormously the hostile and unsympathetic elements of
425 the population but by holding out tempting offers to the poor peasants, the Communists succeeded in fanning anew the flames of class hatred in the villages and in producing the desired effects.

[651] Along with the adoption of the Five Year Plan, the All-Union Congress called for the strengthening of attempts at collectivization. As a result, the amount of grain demanded and the amount of taxes were rapidly raised with the avowed purpose of ruining the kulaks and kurkuls, as they were called in Ukraine. Increased pressure was put upon all classes of the rural population to join collective farms and in some districts this was so effective that almost seventy per cent of the land was turned over for organization on a "voluntary" basis.

As a further step in the same direction there began in 1928 and also in 1929 a furious attack on the richer and middle peasants and a growing insistence on the need of "dekurkulizing" the villages. This meant nothing more or less than the elimination from the countryside of all those people who had prospered under the New Economic Policy. The property of the richer and more prosperous peasants was completely confiscated and they with their families were deprived of all their rights, often including the house where they had lived or the shacks into which they could crawl for shelter. With superb inhumanity the Bolsheviks would drive formerly wealthy peasants and their families from their homes in the middle of winter and leave them without food or clothing and would threaten any of their relatives or friends who dared to give them any relief.

In the first stages of the process, cases were known where some of these richer people were moved out of the Ukraine with their goods and cattle, but as the Communists settled down to their work, they simply seized everything for their own use and that of the collective farms and contented themselves with shooting or deporting their enemies, often to the far north for work in the

forests or to northeastern Siberia for work in the mines and in the more remote parts of the wilderness.[1]

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661
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1 A graphic account of this dekurkulization was given in a DP camp by Sh., a former peasant of the district of Kharkiv:

"On May 22, 1929, all my property, tools, cattle, building and clothing were confiscated. I and my family (my wife, six small children and my mother), were left without means of livelihood; we stayed with people like old folks, ate what we were given, although people were forbidden to give to us. On November 27, in spite of the fact that there was snow on the ground and 15 degrees of frost, I and my entire family, without clothes and half-naked, were put out of the house. Until February, 1930 I lived in another house which was half fallen down. On February 28, I, my wife and six children (my mother had disappeared; I do not know where) were arrested and with other dekurkulized persons were sent to the railroad station. There we were packed into freight cars as sardines in a barrel and travelled for 11 days, without knowing our destination. We were fed once every two days. Many perished from cold and exhaustion. We finally reached the station of Makarikha near Kotlas, district of Archangel, and in 40 degrees of frost, we were detrained in the woods in the snow.

"Then all those able to work were driven to forest operations 300 kilometers from Kotlas. They drove us half shod in the intense cold. They fed us on the way 300 grams of bread, 5 grams of barley and 3 grams of salt per person a day. Many died on the way. Many, unable to walk further, were shot on the spot. There we cut wood and they treated us very badly. The norms of work were abnormally high. We lived in huts which were holes we dug ourselves. Of the many thousands of people who came there more than half died of exhaustion, hunger and cold.

"Of the members of the families of kurkuls who remained at the station of Makarikha, more than half froze. Among these were my sons Ivan and Fedir; a third son Hryhory died of exhaustion. Later all the children up to 14, including three of mine, were returned to Ukraine but I have no further news of them. They probably perished. In 1932, first my wife and then I escaped by hiding in cars loaded with wood. I found work in the Don Basin. In 1937 my wife was arrested suddenly and shot in the prison of Artemivsk in the Don Basin. I escaped because I was living under an assumed name. Now I am a DP and living in Germany in an IRO camp."

423 474 661 425 They followed this up at the end of 1929 by providing for the compulsory collectivization of all the land. Private holding of land was abolished and so was private use. The peasants were forced into collective farms to which they had to contribute all of their livestock, agricultural implements and tools. Then they were left nothing that they could call their own except a small garden plot that was assigned to each family for the purpose of raising those types of vegetables that it was not profitable to raise in large quantities, because the collective farms were occupied with those types of agriculture that were selected for them by the central authorities in Moscow.

The immediate result differed in different places. In Great Russian territory, where the principle of the community ownership of land had definitely taken root, the peasants complied without too much hesitation. In Ukraine and Kuban, where the older style of Ukrainian agriculture had been long in vogue, the peasants became sulky. They killed off large numbers of their cattle and livestock of various kinds. The government, seeing this tremendous loss, then tried to eliminate from the collectives and liquidate in one way or another all of those who had been guilty of disobedience to the order requiring the peasants to contribute all their wealth.

There developed almost a civil war in some sections of the country as discontent rose and the peasants were prepared to die rather than to yield. Nevertheless, this time the government was not prepared to concede anything, as it had in 1921, and despite remarks by Stalin that in some details the Communists had become dizzy from success, the regime held its course and even continued to apply the screws more tightly. The result was the famine of 1932 and 1933.

country for less populated districts in the east, while, on the slightest 166
suspicions, whole families were deported, separated and exiled, and 626
their places taken by people from other Soviet republics who were brought in to destroy the racial unity that formerly existed in the villages.

To appreciate the difficulties of the peasants on the collective 241
farms, we must remember that the involved bureaucratic system 651
had ample opportunities for extorting the grain for little or no 474
payment. Thus the Motor Transport Stations which controlled 465
all the machinery were supported by payments from the collective farms of grain and other products in kind and this usually approached 21.5% of the total yield, while the Stations took over 23% of the crop for the government. Another 15% was retained by the kolhosp for sowing and for various insurance funds that were prescribed by law and another 18% was kept for fodder and for the compensation of the full-time administrators. Thus, there was barely a quarter of the produce left to be distributed among the working population and this was the variable quantity since all of the payments and collections were based not on the actual harvest but on the harvest as planned by the central authorities. Thus, in the case of a bad harvest, the share allotted for distribution was the part that was cut and the government, so far as possible was provided with its expected supply.

This amount was divided among the individuals and families on the basis of the labor days which they had worked. In the beginning a labor day meant labor for a day, no matter how many hours of labor were required, but even before World War II, this simple definition was replaced by a specification that it covered a definite amount of work and it might very easily happen that a slow or poor workman would have to work more than one day to make a labor day. Thus, there was the possibility of still further exploitation of the workmen, who could not know accurately until the end of the year on what they could count.

There was also distributed, likewise in proportion to labor days, a certain sum of money which the kolhosp received from the government in return for the sale of grain over the amount col-

[1 after 1933 famine - - Analyst]

lected for the tax in kind. This was a negligible sum and the average member rarely received more than one ruble per labor day. This sum was, of course, insufficient to provide for the goods which the family needed to purchase, and since their share of the grain was rarely sufficient to feed them, their situation became hopeless, while of other products the individual received about one litre of oil, fifty kilograms of potatoes, thirty-five kilograms of fruit, and five-tenths kilograms of meat and fat.

The real significance of these figures is shown in the prices that were charged in the state stores. There a kilogram of bread cost ninety kopecks, ten eggs brought eight rubles, a kilogram of beef twenty-four rubles, and a pair of boots four hundred and fifty rubles, while a farmer's suit of clothes cost five hundred rubles.

It made the peasant really dependent upon his individual plot of land if he was to secure any necessities. This was far too small and its use was bound with many restrictions. Thus, no family was allowed to hold more than one cow and two calves, one sow, up to ten goats, an undefined number of chickens and up to twenty beehives. In the beginning it was possible for the peasant to secure a certain amount of food for these animals from the common store. He was allowed to retain the manure and it was thus possible for him to improve his own individual plot and thus to secure larger returns. It was a liberal application of such principles that had rendered possible the general improvement which was noticeable during the years 1934-6, when the government was endeavoring to make the system of collective farms workable.

It can be easily seen that the system of allowing individual incomes was based on a principle opposite that of the New Economic Policy, for it would require scarcely a legislative enactment to reduce these amounts while the New Economic Policy presented a norm of profit to the workers. Yet with each year, once the government was convinced of its success, it found it possible in various ways to tap this new source of income for its own purposes.

The favorite method was by taxation. Thus, by 1939 if we should assume that the average family received in cash four hun-

[Ukraine - after 1933 famine -- Analyst]

dred and eighty karbovantsy, they would be required to pay twenty-two and a half karb. in taxes, twenty in rent, fifty as a special tax and they would be required to volunteer to take at least two hundred in government bonds.

Even this did not cover the total payments to the government. With its usual love of double-talk and subterfuge, the government, which controlled every branch of human activity in the USSR, talked of the establishment of socialism and levied indirect taxes on all transactions so that the actual cost to the villagers of any manufactured article was about three times what it cost the government as producer. The whole subject was carefully veiled as a state secret to protect the Soviet Union against capitalist intrigues but the unfortunate population were the unwilling contributors to this new order of life.

Under such conditions it is extremely difficult to pierce the veil of percentages as to cost and production and give a reliable estimate as to the amount of money received for the government or the relationship between the sums spent in maintaining the operation of the Moscow-controlled factories in Ukraine and the amount spent upon the needs of the population either individually, as families or as citizens of the UkSSR or of the UkSSR as a governmental unity within the Soviet sphere. From those figures which the Soviet has let out, it is possible to see that the yearly budget of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic has run from 2½-5% of the budget of the USSR while the population has been at least 18% of the total population.

With the villages compelled to yield the last pound of grain, etc., that could be extracted by force, and receiving in return almost no manufactured goods, the position of the city workmen and the intelligentsia was little better. The wages of the workmen were always insufficient, the housing conditions were hardly endurable, and the only point of betterment was that the larger places and some of the plants especially favored by the regime received more manufactured goods of a poor quality and at a high price which the fortunate people might be able to secure.

727 their posts and the vast majority of those who were Communists
316 received more or less sinecures above ground. Their places were
[466] taken by forcing the Ukrainian peasants, including a large percentage of young girls, to work in the pits with the minimum of safeguards. Little money was appropriated for the restoration of the damaged housing, for as the writer Korniychuk declared in one of his works, "Ukraine was so thankful for the success of Stalin that they did not care how they lived, for if he had perished, life would not be worth living under any circumstances."

727 With this attitude prominently emphasized by the leading propagandists, it is easy to see that the resources and energies of the population were directed by force rather toward those items that would advance the importance and the convenience of Moscow, than those that would be of advantage to the local population.

[496] The one exception was the necessity for rebuilding immediately and strengthening the railroad communications between the Donbas, Moscow, Leningrad and the Black Sea ports—in other words, the extreme eastern part of the Ukraine which was slated for a special development with roads and railroads linking the country up with the Russian centres rather than with the other Ukrainian centres to the west for these were regarded as exposed centres in case of a new outbreak of hostilities and were to be neglected until they were masked by the extension of Soviet power over the satellite countries.

• 474
341 The collectivized agriculture was in little better shape. In that part of the Ukraine which had been under Soviet control before 1939, the authorities revived the collective farms but they had been so badly ruined that at first the authorities were often willing to be more considerate of the members. Immediately after the war they allowed them to group themselves into links or permanent sections of some eight to ten people who would thus come to feel themselves a distinct unit in the collective farm. It did not take long for the more rigid Communists to decide that this sense of permanence was in a way a defiance of the principles of collectivization, for very often members of the same household, if it were at all numerous, would group themselves into a link. In such cases the link became more prosperous, for it was in a way

a revival of that form of family agriculture which had long been popular in the Ukraine before the collectivization. Furthermore, it was soon suspected that the links varied in their delivery of supplies to the government, sometimes in inverse proportion to their own readiness to work. The peasants likewise as in the early days of the NEP devoted more attention to their own private plots of land, a phenomenon that had been noticed even before World War II.

The Soviet authorities had several answers to such developments. On the one hand, they finally forbade the operation of the permanent links which had developed to the point where they threatened the objective of collectivization, the turning of the peasant farmer into a paid proletarian worker in agriculture. On the other hand they reduced the size again of the individual plot of land and they forced the peasants to give up animal raising on their plots by charging them for even the straw from the collective farms and the wild fodder that grew in abandoned places. Then again, they levied a tax on the products of these plots and this, plus the reduction of the allotment, rendered it impossible for the peasant to improve his lot except through increased work on the collective farm. In the meanwhile the steady raising of the quota of work required for one labor day made it impossible for the average peasant, unless he was a Stakhanovist (i.e. a person who cooperated with the central regime and thereby received favorable assignments) to complete one labor day within one calendar day, no matter how long hours he worked. This had been a favorite device of the Russian landlords as we learn from Radishchev's *Journey from Petersburg to Moscow*, a famous Russian radical work of the end of the eighteenth century but a modern version of it was adapted by the Russian Communist leaders and used effectively.

Even these measures were not the desirable solution. This was first proposed by Khrushchov in 1947, and while it was at first looked upon with some disfavor, it was finally deemed suitable by the slave-drivers of the Kremlin, and Khrushchov, after a period of mild disfavor, was promoted to the Politburo, and another Russian, Melnikov, placed in charge of Ukraine. This was the

474 creation of great "agro-cities" or "agro-settlements" which would
241 unite several collective farms in one great centre which could be
665 more easily controlled by the Communist Party with a smaller number of qualified party members in charge. By the end of 1950 the number of kolhosps (collective farms) had been reduced from 33,653, as at the end of the war, to 14,443. The number of households in one had grown from 163 households to 277. At the same time the number of collective farms in which there were definite party leaders had increased from 42% to 78%. This does not imply a growth in Communist membership, for the number of Communist authorities might, under the new ratio, be reduced by almost 3,000 in personnel. This would be hardly likely but it explains at a glance the increased control that the Communists could exert over the larger groups. It also made it easier by destroying the separated villages to prevent as effective help being given to the U. P. A. and the other anti-Communist movements which lingered on, as the peasants saw that the new era was to be not one of peace but of increased hardships. At the same time, the
423 peasant was made more helpless for his holdings in the neighbor-
241 hood of his home were reduced to 0.15 hectare or approximately a third of an acre.

This area is roughly equivalent to the average American suburban lot of 150 x 100 feet and on this the average peasant family was supposed, no matter how many members it contained, to raise all the vegetables, eggs and milk which the family required for the year and also any other plant or animal requirement which was needed as a cash crop. Even this was now burdened with taxes and the peasant was forbidden to secure anything from the collective farm to assist in his economy, outside of what he secured in his pay for a steadily diminishing number of labor days and the accompanying cash and kind receipts which were apportioned to him for his work.

474 Estimates based on figures from some collective farms show
434 that the average family receives for its year's work, if three or four
241 members work, something in the neighborhood of three hundred pounds of grain, four hundred pounds of potatoes and about one

thousand karbovantsy in money. When we remember that, as a result of the Soviet tax system, a pair of shoes cost five hundred karbovantsy and a suit of average quality a little more than one thousand karbovantsy, we can see how dependent the average peasant is upon his small plot on which his egg tax is, whether he raises eggs or not, two hundred per year. In addition, from his cash resources he must buy the grain for his hens or raise it on his own plot.

It is small wonder that the foreign visitor is not welcomed on these collective farms except in a few places which are kept for show. In all of them the Communist heads receive very satisfactory living conditions with opportunities to purchase supplies at very moderate prices in shops devised for Communist administrators, and it is these administrators, and the Communists of the Motor Tractor Stations and the MVD who receive almost the entire income that is allotted to the collective farm.

The position of the city laborer is little better, although he receives in connection with his plant the opportunity of securing whatever the factory heads feel like giving him for food in the factory dining rooms.

In 1946-7, before Western Ukraine was fully Communized, there was another drought in the black earth region and once again starvation hung as a spectre over the entire population. Those who had the strength and courage to get to Western Ukraine in search of food were surprised how much food there was still to be found in those areas where the peasants were still allowed to use their own energy, skill and knowledge even on their own small farms which still looked like paradise to those poor devils who had passed through the period of the thirties.

Still later, collectivization was introduced into Western Ukraine and the other accompaniments of the regime in the east were at once apparent.

The Fifth Five Year Plan which was adopted in 1950 continued and intensified the process. From the figures which has been revealed, it is obvious that the increases which have been demanded of the Ukraine in this period are relatively minor. There

[Post-WORLD WAR II -1945 -- Analyst]

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1



Komitet Dopomohy), was able, even on the eve of German evacuation, to provide meals for 36,000 persons (children and others unable to work),[22] one sixth of the city's population; its great popularity[23] was of tremendous importance in enabling Bohatyrchuk to secure support for his stand in favor of coalition with anti-Soviet Russians. On the other hand, in Dniepropetrovsk, where the city administration was largely in the hands of pro-Russian elements, the Ukrainians, inspired by an OUN-M organizer, formed a Red Cross organization which acted as a center for nationalist forces.

The nationalist element was more successful in the field of cooperative organization. While each city administration contained a department of trade, the cooperatives, as quasi-public bodies, appear to have been considerably more important as channels of local initiative. Far from being a product of the Communist regime, the cooperative movement was indigenous to both East and West Ukraine, having played an important role before the First World War, when it was already imbued with nationalist overtones.[24] In the NEP period of Soviet rule, and until the late twenties, the cooperatives had been able to maintain a considerable degree of independence and had, at least in the Kharkov region, served as a center for nationalist elements which worked with the Republican government.[25] In the Five Year Plan periods, the urban cooperatives had become adjuncts of the state trading systems, and other cooperatives had been closely integrated into state commercial operations.[26]

[21] *Nove Ukrains'ke Slovo*, September 19, 1943, pp. 4–5; see also *Volyn'*, January 28, 1943, p. 3.

[22] Tarkovych in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, February 8, 1942, p. 4.

[23] For abundant details on the complex system of cooperatives developed in the Ukraine prior to 1917, see Eugene M. Kayden and Alexis N. Antsiferov, *The Cooperative Movement in Russia During the War* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1929), a volume in the *Economic and Social History of the World War*, ed. James T. Shotwell, Russian Series, compiled for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Division of Economics and History. Cooperatives were far more developed in the Ukraine than in most other heavily populated areas of the Russian Empire (*ibid.*, pp. 40, 41, 266–69, 357), and served educational as well as economic development. Kharkov was the chief cooperative center in the Ukraine and was largely independent of the Russian centers.

[24] Interview 73.

[25] Alexander Baikov, *The Development of the Soviet Economic System* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1946), p. 253; Arthur C. Arnold, *Banks, Credit, and Money in Soviet Russia* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1937), p. 477.

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1



737 When the Germans arrived, surviving leaders of the former
474 independent cooperatives were again able to assert themselves. As early as the winter of 1941–42, there was a total of 643 cooperative organizations in the Kiev region, including forty-eight *raion* food societies which bought agricultural produce and carried on economic organization;[27] in the city of Kharkov there were 150 cooperatives, which maintained close contacts with their sources of food stocks in the countryside.[28] There were, in addition to numerous distributing cooperatives, twenty-eight producing cooperatives in Kiev, in such diverse fields as transport, printing, and haberdashery.[29] The Ukrainbank (All-Ukrainian Cooperative Bank), which had been formed in 1922 for financing all types of cooperatives, but incorporated in the Soviet central Torgbank in 1936, was revived.[30]

737 Moreover, there were more direct links to the nationalist move-
474 ments. An effort was made, with German approval, to organize
186 a general center for the food cooperatives, known as the All-Ukrainian Cooperative Society (Vseukraïns'ka Kooperatyvna Spilka), which coordinated local organizations, published a bulletin, and restored the museum of the history of cooperative development, an institution of considerable significance for nationalist sentiment.[31] Under an old officer of the Ukrainian army, Professor Perevertuna, a close collaborator of the OUN-M, it carried out activities on a large scale in the Kiev area, especially training replacements for the diminished ranks of cooperative workers.[32] In addition to more indirect fostering of nationalist sentiment, its aid to the nationalist cause included employing persons whom the Germans had dismissed from the municipal administration.[33] In early 1943, however, such activities resulted in the execution of the director.[34]

[27] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, February 4, 1942, p. 3.
[28] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, February 24, 1942, p. 2.
[29] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, February 5, 1942, p. 2.
[30] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, February 10, 1942, p. 4. Cf. Baikov, p. 86, and Arnold, p. 477, for the background of this bank.
[31] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, February 4, 1942, p. 3.
[32] *Deutsche Ukraine Zeitung*, July 11, 1942, p. 3.
[33] *OUN u Viini* (The OUN in the War), Information Section of the OUN (UNR), April, 1946, p. 75.
[34] *Ibid.*; *Entsyklopediia Ukraïnoznavstva* (Encyclopedia of Things Ukrainian), eds. Volodymyr Kubiiovych and Zenon Kuzelia (Munich: Naukove Tovarystvo im. Shevchenka, 1949), p. 585.

7:Bregy & Obolensky H-4, 5 (no date) 1940 RD1 Ukraine RD1



applying improved methods of working and in engaging 243
in a selection of varieties as demanded by the mills and the exporters.

The State and local organizations equally try to come to the aid of the cultivators in order to improve the quality and raise the production of this precious grain.

The Soviet State, wishing to substitute itself for all [474] former capitalist enterprises, organized the *sovkhoses* (State agricultural enterprises), where it tried to return to the pre-war traditions of exploitation. The general system of Soviet economy does not, however, permit the organization of the exploitation of wheat on a commercial scale. The figures which we have just cited cannot be applied to the Soviet Ukraine in its present state. Actually agricultural decadence during the Civil War and the period of militant communism and the collectivization of the peasants had disorganized all that which had been done during the preceding epoch for the rational exploitation of this important resource. The widespread utilization of tractors has not yet compensated for the losses which have been sustained. Nevertheless wheat remains and will remain the essential product of Ukrainian soil. It is its most important agricultural potential.

Although the cultivation of maize, almost entirely concentrated in Zone 2,[1] only occupies the fourth place among the cereals of the Ukraine, its importance is great owing to the fact that this country alone produces 65 per cent of the maize of the Soviet Union. On the other hand this crop is a very recommendable phase in the enrichment of the soils, whose supply of water and chemical salts is pitilessly exhausted by the growing of wheat, more so, as in order to replace them the utilization of manure in the southern regions sometimes presents a certain danger owing to the possible droughts.

1 [See category 116, PP. 139-140---Analyst]

the industrialisation of Russia. The production of the heavy industries in Ukraine gave in 1931 63% of the whole output of coal, 83% of the production of coke and 77% of iron ore of the USSR (*Izvestia:* Moscow, March 1, 1932). "The production of the Ukrainian plants solves the entire problem of metals in the whole Soviet Union" — the Kharkov *Communist* wrote on October 13, 1931. With these demands on the Ukrainian national economy Moscow placed the workers of Ukraine in the worst conditions. In the wage index the Ukrainian metal workers stood in 1931 in the 11th place, the miners in the 19th, the coke workers in the 27th place (*Izvestia:* Moscow, February 1, 1932). The conditions of work, dwelling, social insurance and cultural service of the workers in Ukraine were much worse than in Russia.

The forced collectivisation of the Ukrainian agriculture, started in 1929/30, caused horrible devastation among the Ukrainian peasants. Not less than 200,000 farms were destroyed, their property was taken into the collective farms (*Communist,* Kharkov, December 21, 1934). The owners of these farms, the so-called 'kulaks', were deported together with their families into the North of Russia, where they mostly died of hunger and disease caused by forced labour. If one counts a normal Ukrainian peasant family at least 6 persons the number of those ruined and destroyed by this collectivisation reached 1,200,000 persons. In reality the number of the victims of Stalin's 'General Line' was much greater.

This 'liquidation of the kulaks as a class' has not only taken the lives of millions of Ukrainian farmers: it has destroyed the best elements among the peasants. These peasants were no 'exploiters': they were able farmers who tilled their land in the sweat of their brows and produced grain for their families and for the market. Due to this absurd and cruel 'liquidation of the kulaks' the shortages in the supply of agricultural products grew enormously.

Simultaneously with the 'General Line' the centralisation in Ukraine to Moscow's advantage was tightened: in the administration, in both economy and cultural work. In November 1929, the Commissariat of Agriculture of Ukraine was abolished and Ukrainian agriculture was subordinated directly to Moscow. The autonomy of Ukraine in the field of education was considerably restricted; in 1931 the separate Commissariat of the Interior in Ukraine was abolished; in 1933 the Commissariat of Justice was subordinated to Moscow, etc.

According to the directives from Moscow the Ukrainian culture had to be 'national in form, Communist in content'. Therefore

8: Fedenko H-4, 5 (no date) 1951 RD1 Ukraine RD1
Soviet Union R2

the former director of the Ukrainian National Library in Kiev, declared before the purge commission in 1933:

"I am being persecuted, because my name ends with 'ko', because I am a Ukrainian (*The First Results of the Purge:* Moscow, 1934).

### 6. *The 'Organised' Famine in Ukraine in 1932/33*

The purge in Ukraine was taking place in the conditions of a famine more terrible than that the Ukrainians had known in 1921/22. If the famine of 1921/22 was caused by extraordinary drought and bad harvest, and was only increased by the exploitation of the Soviet Russian Government, the famine of 1932/33 in Ukraine and the North Caucasus was organised by Moscow according to a plan made in advance: on the corpses of millions of Ukrainians the Soviet Russian Government wished to establish its forced collectivisation.

The reaction of the peasants in Russia and Ukraine with regard to the collectivisation was different. The Ukrainian peasant is attached to his own land in another way than the Russian. In Russia the remainder of the primitive 'obshchina', a system in which the whole land belonged to the community, every member of which received at periodical partitions allotments of land according to the number of 'souls' or 'eaters', still existed. For this reason the Russian peasant did not cling to his land, for he did not know how long he could till his allotment. Besides, the peasants in Russia, who were accustomed to obedience during the half of a millennium by the tyrannical régime of the Tsars, obeyed the order of the Soviet Government almost without resistance and went into the collective farms. The Ukrainian peasant, freedom-loving, with a feeling of personal dignity, refused to go into the collective farms, for he rightly regarded them as a worse economic system than serfdom was. Moscow knew the free, inflexible character of the Ukrainians, and organised therefore the famine in Ukraine in order to break the resistance of the peasants. For this purpose all food the Ukrainian peasant population possessed was in the course of 1932/33 taken by force through the Communist administration. These food stocks were exported to Russia or abroad. As the consequence of this a terrible famine began in Ukraine. The well-known American journalist W. H. Chamberlin calls it 'political famine'*).

Though rumours about the starving of the Ukrainians went abroad, Moscow stubbornly denied the fact of famine in Ukraine. To prevent the world from learning the true conditions in Ukraine

*) W. H. Chamberlin, The Ukraine a Submerged Nation: New York, 1944.

Ukrainians where they died in masses from insufficient food and disease. The Polish Government abolished in Galicia most of the Ukrainian schools which had existed in the times of Austrian rule. In the schools in Galicia, Volhynia and other Ukrainian territories, the Polish authorities conducted a forced Polonisation. The Ukrainian University that had been created in Lviw in 1920 privately was suppressed by the Polish Government. Simultaneously, the admission of Ukrainians to Polish Universities was made extraordinarily diffucult. State officials of Ukrainian nationality were dismissed in masses by the Polish Government, and new applicants were not accepted. Even the national name 'Ukrainian' the Polish Government did not recognise and ordered the use officially only of the archaic name 'Ruthenian'. At the elections to the Polish Diet and Senate in 1928, for the first time under Polish rule, the Ukrainians of Galicia took part. The Ukrainian population gave its voices at the elections for two parties: the party of the democratic centre (UNDO — Ukrainian National Democratic Union — under the leadership of Dmytro Levytsky) and the Ukrainian Socialist Radical Party, led by Ivan Makukh.

After the termination of the Polish-Ukrainian war in 1919, on the Western Ukrainian territories economic reconstruction by the Ukrainian population themselves began, predominantly in the form of co-operative societies. In 1924 in Lviw the Central Co-operative Bank was founded, and a central institution for all co-operative societies organised *(Centro-Soyuz)*. The Ukrainian co-operative movement in Poland was headed by the Revisional Association of Co-operatives, which had about 500,000 members and had more than 12,000 employees. The Association of Ukrainian Dairy Co-operation *(Maslosoyuz)*, supplied dairy products, not only for the Polish market, but exported many of its products to the countries of Western Europe.

The Polish Government looked on the Ukrainian economic activity with displeasure and tried to hinder the development of Ukrainian co-operative societies and private economic initiative. In 1934, by order of the Polish Government, the operations of the Revisional Association of the Ukrainian Co-operatives were limited only to Galicia. Ukrainian co-operative societies in other Ukrainian territories in Poland, about 450, were forced to be subordinated to Polish co-operative centres.

The Warsaw Government carried on a systematic colonisation in the overpopulated Ukrainian territories. The Ukrainian peasants were excluded from the right of land reform. Having no opport-

563 and were even persecuted as 'infected by nationalism'. For the
423 Ukrainian peasants a land reform was proclaimed at the cost of the
• 474 big landowners, but simultaneously the organisation of collective farms was started, and this caused serious bitterness among the masses of the people. It should be pointed out that between the Western Ukrainian territories recently occupied by the Soviet Army and the old USSR a strictly guarded police border was preserved, in order to prevent any contact between the population of these territories.

### *2. The Ukrainians under Rumanian Rule (Bukovina and Bessarabia)*

563 In 1918 Rumania occupied Bessarabia and Bukovina. The first had been a Russian province, the second had belonged to Austria. In these provinces there were about 1 million Ukrainians at that time. From the beginning of the Rumanian occupation, for 10 years, the state of siege was maintained. This paralysed the political, economic and cultural organisation of the Ukrainians. From 1922, all Ukrainian schools were transformed into Rumanian. The Rumanian Government did not recognise the Ukrainians as a separate nation but declared that the Ukrainians in Bessarabia and Bukovina were 'Rumanians by origin who had forgotten the Rumanian language'. During the state of siege in Bukovina the Ukrainian books in the public libraries were confiscated; in the Churches the Rumanian language was introduced. The Ukrainian co-operative societies were destroyed by administrative oppressions. The only sign of Ukrainian national life was the Ukrainian press, but against this press the Rumanian authorities placed various obstacles.

[665] In 1927 in Bukovina the Ukrainian National Party was founded. This party won at the elections to the Rumanian Parliament 3 mandates — 2 Deputies and 1 Senator.

[204] The Rumanian authorities greatly feared the possibilities of the development of the Ukrainian movement, and did not admit in Bessarabia even the Ukrainian press, while the Russian press was allowed.

728 In 1940 Rumania ceded Bukovina and Bessarabia to the USSR.
661 The Ukrainian parts of these countries were united with Soviet Ukraine, the territories populated by Moldavians were added to the Moldavian Socialist Soviet Republic, founded as far back as 1925 within the boundaries of Soviet Ukraine. The Soviet occupation by its terrorism and economic policy (forced collectivisation) soon disappointed the population of Bessarabia and Bukovina.

[1. In W... Ukraine under Soviet rule, Sept. 1939 -- Analyst]

10: Weinstein S-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1



in the Ukraine more dangerous than the Ukrainian variety, no additional attention was given to the problem of Russian children.

In 1933, however, the offensive against Ukrainian nationalism occasioned a review of the Ukrainization process. Ukrainian nationalism had been considered a dangerous force since 1926, when Shumskii and Khvilovoi — two important figures in the Ukrainian Commissariat of Education — were censured for desiring "to orient Ukrainian culture on capitalist Europe rather than on socialist Moscow." The Party became still more alert to signs of nationalism after the uncovering in 1929 of the Society for the Emancipation of the Ukraine, a secret organization headed by such outstanding nationalists as Efremov, Germaize and Nikovskii. But it was the campaign against the collectivization of agriculture which occasioned the intensive campaign against the nationalists. The Party regarded the opposition to collectivization as the result in large part of the nationalists, and it set out to remove them from every branch of political, economic and cultural activity. The central figure in the campaign was Nicholas Skripnik, an "Old Bolshevik" who was accused of having fallen under the influence of his nationalist colleagues and was removed from his position as Commissar of Education in March 1933. Even before his removal, however, the Commissariat of Education and all of its activities were under fire.

Charges of over-Ukrainization of the school system were first launched in an editorial appearing in *Kommunist* (the organ of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party) in February 1933, and reprinted in other newspapers. The editorial said: "The mistakes and perversions in realizing the Ukrainization of the schools led in a considerable number of places to neglecting and ignoring the interests of the national minorities and especially the needs and requirements of the Russian toiling masses living in the Ukraine. Among responsible circles of the Commissariat there was concocted the 'theory' that the majority of the children in the cities, small towns and other labor centers speak a mixed Ukrainian-Russian jargon, and that therefore the majority of these children should study in the Ukrainian language. As a result, a significant part of the Russian toiling masses were deprived of schools in their native language and actually subjected to the forced Ukrainization which the Party had condemned in all of its directives."[65] Shortly after this editorial appeared, an article in *Proletarska Pravda* stated that in Kiev only 49 percent of the Russian children and 30 percent of the Jewish children studied in schools conducted in their native languages; that although

[65] *Ibid.*, Feb. 20, 1933.

423 tax collection and, finally, also corresponded
241 to the patriarchal order. It was only in the former Polish Ukraine on the right side of the river that purely private ownership was retained. The Bolshevik NEP now very cleverly fastened on to the community field system.

241 With the restoration of peace and order during the NEP years the social life of the peasant country again attained its equilibrium. The families which before that were broken up or dismembered now came together again. At the same time, great efforts were made to raise the productive capacity of the new family farms by means of technical education, and in this the young farmers were particularly eager to join. At that time, a German observer wrote: "In the activity of the youth organizations in the villages we see an expression of the deep longing to be freed at last from 'the power of darkness' and not always to stand apart while the civilized races divide up the treasures of the earth among themselves." (88)

88. Veit: Farming Economy and Agrarian Set-up of the South Ukraine, page 69.

423 This hopeful development was abruptly inter-
241 rupted by the subsequent third phase of the agra-
474 rian revolution, the transfer of the individual
185 peasant farm to communal ownership of all village inhabitants. It was only by means of collectivism, the coordination of the farms with the communes in the other economic fields, that the Bolshevik regime could last; it was only in this way that one could strike at the root of Ukrainian nationalism, and only thus carry out the Five Year Plan. For industrial development with the purchase of foreign /146/ machines had to be paid for by exporting agricultural products. All that was needed now was a command, in order to maintain the export of the necessary amounts of grain at the prescribed price.

the prescribed price.

According to ideas in Moscow, the score had to come out even. It could not be difficult at last to introduce more modern agricultural methods along with the collective farms. The tractors, it was believed, would surely bring it about. However, Moscow made its figures without consulting the Ukrainian farmer whose individualistic bent and stubborn adherence to private property were to cause the equalizers the worst difficulties imaginable.

Collectivism began in the year 1928 with wonderful promises. In 1929 only 2% of the planted surface of the Ukraine was communal and cultivated according to a plan. In other words, there was resistance along the whole front! Now extortionate taxation was applied. Unlimited taxation in money and grain made the peasants ripe for the "voluntary" adoption of the collective. Hotbeds of resistance were exterminated. There was now no turning back in this agrarian revolution from above, for the Five Year Plan was at stake. A Ukrainian victory would have had incalculable consequences for Moscow. Not in vain had the Muscovites been trained from the time of Ivan the Terrible and particularly by Peter the Great and Catherine to break down stubborness. The methods which the Bolsheviks now used to assert their will were old; it was only the technique that was new.

Compulsory collectivism on a large scale began in 1929 with the suppression of free sales of products from the individual farms with the removal of surplus and with political persecution. There was almost nothing left over from the 1929 harvest. Planting in 1930 was inadequate, for the work of those who were exiled had to be added to the regular work. In 1931 conditions worsened. The lack of draft animals was simply catastrophic, for the farmers had/147/ slaughtered all the cattle that should have been

474 given to the collective without compensation. The
475 country people carried on sabotage wherever possible. The Bolsheviks retaliated with relentless and merciless war. The Ukrainian Deputy Prime Minister Skrypnyk complained in July 1932 at the Party Conference in the presence of Molotov and Kaganovich: "Absolutely everything has been taken away from us. That is why we are without bread, that is why we are suffering from hunger." (89) There was not enough manpower to bring in

89. Visti for July 11, 1932.

the harvest, so the authorities combed the streets of the cities and forthwith transported in trucks to the villages everyone who could not give a satisfactory account of himself. The gipsy bands - some of them had German passports - escaped toward the west. In the spring of 1933 famine took its toll of countless peasant families in one of the most fertile regions of the earth, and those that remained alive nourished themselves on roots and grass or fled into the cities of stone and wood in order to find bread there. According to accounts of the secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Ukraine, Kosior, at the Party Conference in Kiyev, about 300 million pood of grain was lost in the 1932 harvest, because it was not harvested but it rotted in the fields or at the collection centers. (90) For a long time now it

90. Kovalevskyj: Chervony Terror na Ukraini, p. 123 ff./Red Terror in the Ukraine/

was not the individual farmers who practiced sabotage in order to escape the collective, it was the Kolkhoz (collective farms) themselves that bitterly resisted Moscow's demands. The Ukrainian communists and Soviet officials were

474 425 accused of collaboration in preventing the warehousing of grain. As early as December 6, 1932 the Council of the People's Commissars came to the following decision: "The resistance of those communists who in reality have become leaders of the sabotage, as well as the passive and favorably disposed attitude of various Party organizations toward this sabotage shall be liquidated." (91)

91. Salisnyak: "The Struggle Between the Ukraine and Moscow in the Soviet Union" Nation und Staat, July-November, 1937.

In 1933, after a four-year struggle, the resistance of the Ukrainian people against that new order which seemed to the Muscovites to be the purpose of the state, was broken. Moscow, /148/ without any regard for the victims among its opponent, had fought a hard battle of nationalities and won. The Communist of December 11, 1934 gives a faint picture of the extent of this catastrophe when it reports that during the period of collectivization 200,000 Ukrainian farms were destroyed and their owners along with their families were exiled to North Russia.

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563 The Bolshevik agrarian revolution with all its consequences also did not spare the descendants of those German emigrants who had moved to the Ukraine between 1789 and 1842. The promise of abundant arable land and freedom of religious worship had at one time attracted these sectarians to this country. They were industrious, capable people who rapidly increased their possessions and multiplied. In 1914 there were 600,000 of them in the region of the Black Sea, 100,000 in the North Caucasus and 200,000 in Volhynia,

563 German wheelwrights (Ukrainian: "stel'makh"), carpenters, smiths and locksmiths (Ukrainian:"sl'usar") were very much in demand. Before the First World War there were 100 German shops in Odessa, among them two bookstores. Factories for agricultural machines arose from small beginnings, and they sent their products as far as Siberia. From 80 to 90% of all Bolshevik factories for agricultural machinery were founded by Germans.

The Germans were not spared their toll of blood in the Ukraine. At the beginning of the First World War they had to suffer in the persecutions of the Czarist regime. Then they fought with Denikin and Wrangel against the Bolsheviks and were defeated. Finally the "death taxes" began, which were followed by a new civil war and the famine. No one knows how many of our compatriots lost their lives in these catastrophes. Many emigrated to Canada and the United States as long as they were still able to do so.

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●474 Thus after the Ukraine was prostrate, Moscow could without danger loosen the noose. This was also dictated by the instinct for self-preservation, for bread and meat were urgently needed for the growing industrial areas. The process of making collectives out of small private properties was abandoned. When at the Seventeenth Party Congress in January and February 1934 an urgent recommendation was issued for people to lead a "joyous and happy life", those who had been murdered or who had died of hunger no longer heard it, and for the ones who were exiled it sounded like bitter sarcasm. At the same time concessions were granted in the household and horticultural economy of the members of the collectives. The new collective economy statute of 1935 permits the individual farmer to own /150/ 1 hectare of land, 1 cow and 2 heifers, 5 pigs, 10 sheep or

474 goats and poultry, whereby allowance was made for regional variations. Thus Kuban Cossacks may also keep a horse, and their individual property around the farm can be two hectares in size.

474 233 The census of cattle in 1935 showed that these concessions were necessary. This census showed that livestock in the Soviet Union had been reduced to about one-half from 1928 to 1935. At the same time the minimum during the summer of 1933 had already been overcome, and there was a gradual increase in cattle-raising noticeable. From 1928 to 1935 the number of horses had decreased from 5.5 million to 2.5 million, that of horned cattle from 8.5 to 4.9 million, the number of pigs from 6.9 to 4.8 million, and that of goats and sheep from 9.8 to 1.8 million. Conditions were similar in the Kuban region. (94) The Kolhosp /abbrev. for 'collective farm' in Ukrainian; Kolkhoz in Russian. Editor/ had completely failed

94. Kubiyovich: Atlas of the Ukraine and the Bordering Areas, page 38.

in cattle-raising.

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241 What is it that grows in the region of the Soviet Union settled by Ukrainians? Individual cultures have always been subject to considerable fluctuation. During the NEP period the cultivation of wheat receded and rye cultivation increased. The land was extensively farmed, few horses were kept and more sheep. Then came the Bolsheviks and introduced their "rational method of cultivation". That the result of it is not satisfactory was admitted by Stalin at the Eighteenth Congress in March 1939, when he stated that collectivism in the Soviet Union had, it is true, embraced 93.5% of the entire peasantry, but that he could not

249 the coast of the Black Sea, divides into two wide branches at the Sea of Azov, one of which extends up to the Volga and the other down to Ciscaucasia. In the Kuban region the sunflower occupies up to 30% of the entire cultivated land. The lovely blossoms with their coffee-brown centers and their wreath of yellow rays are improbably large in the Kuban country. Oil mills press out the seeds and manufacture table oil from them. The Kuban "dessert varieties" are valued as a delicacy, the seeds of which are eaten like nuts and are as large as dates. In the last few years the cultivation of cotton has been newly introduced all around the Sea of Azov. But its yield is very small, and the surface cultivated fluctuates from year to year. Between 1931 and 1935 an average of about 300,000 hectares was planted. The attempts to grow rice in the Dnepr plains are also new.

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474 /152/ What is a collective farm? The Bolsheviks distinguish between the so-called Soviet farms, the communes and the artels, both also called kolhosp. The Soviet farm is a government estate in which land, buildings, livestock and goods belong to the state. The Soviet farms are supposed to be model farms for agricultural research; their average size is 1000 to 1200 hectares. They are run by "government officials".

The commune is a composite of peasant farms; the individual farms do not have a particular share of land, and it is cultivated according to a general agricultural plan. Its inventory, buildings and products are the property of the community. The members of the commune receive only a share of the yield which they need to cover their living requirements. The commune did not survive as an organizational form of Bolshevik agriculture, but the artel did. In the latter,

474 the inventory of goods, buildings and land are likewise property of the community, but the agricultural products are distributed on a share basis according to work performed, after expenses and reserves have been deducted. In contrast to the commune, the farm produce consumed by the family and the family's household economy are private. Nominally the farmer is co-owner of the kolhosp which the law describes as "agricultural common property on a cooperative basis". The rights and privileges of the farmer who has "voluntarily" joined are set forth in the statute. No compensation is paid for agricultural property brought in by the individual farm. If a farmer withdraws from the kolhosp, what he has brought in is not returned to him, but he can demand an allowance which, however, is very small and in no wise corresponds to the actual value.

162 Of the total of 44.5 million hectares of land in the Soviet Republic in 1938, 29.7 million hectares fell to the kolhosp, 1.8 million to the separate property of the kolhosp farmers, /Facing
439 page 152/ /Map X: Export of Coal and Sugar from Soviet Ukraine. (Average 1927/1928). The Ukrainian supply to the Great Russian areas of coal and sugar shows a similar development as the distribution of grain. In these products, too, export to foreign countries was small./ /153/ 1.5 million hectares to individual non-collective farmers, 4.2 million hectares to Soviet farms and 7.3 million hectares to other properties. (97)

97. Deminsky: "The Economy of the Ukraine" in Deutsche Berufserziehung, No. 15 and 16, p. 135.

414 From a practical point of view the kolhosp represents a large estate whose land lies round about the estate. All the members of the commune are the estate owners. Since the kolhosps are forbidden to employ outside manpower, a stranger cannot

474 find work in the villages. All able-bodied men and women and also young people are required to cooperate in the kolhosp. These forces are divided into so-called work brigades. Thus there is a brigade for field work, another for the grooming of horses, a third for cattle-raising and dairy farming. The farmer has turned into "comrade fieldworker", the hired man into "comrade groom", and the servant girl into "comrade milkmaid". The brigades are divided up into "lanky" (links of a chain). Since the entire system of co-owners gives ample opportunity to shirk and to blame others for one's negligence, individual "links" are now given the entire cultivation of one section of a field, from ploughing to harvesting. In this way one has, quite unintentionally, gone back more or less to the old order in which the individual farm cultivated its land in a similar manner.

The Bolshevik village community has many shortcomings. Love of work and productivity are negligible, for individual industry scarcely effects the amount of wages. But peasant industriousness cannot be dissociated from a good harvest. Therefore, efforts have been made in recent times to spur on Comrade "farm worker" by means of prizes. Distant Moscow determines the plan for sowing; the political board appoints the supervisor of the farm, although according to the statute he should be elected by the members of the kolhosp. A
475 further source of constant trouble, constant bungl-
474 ing and therefore irrevocable losses are the "machine-tractor stations" (MTS). It was precisely with these state organizations for /154/ agricultural machines that Moscow intended to remove all difficulties in the process of modernizing agriculture. Thus the kolhosp were ordered to deliver all their agricultural machinery there. The MTS were to keep it in order and at the same time constantly enlarge their stock of machines by the purchase of new tractors, ploughs, harrows, mowing

475 machines and threshing machines. At the time of
474 sowing and reaping the MTS with all their machines were to be at the disposal of the kolhosp.

474 Let us now imagine a large estate without draft animals and without machines. Before planting time messengers must be sent to a station that is perhaps 40 to 50 kilometers distant, with the request that machines be sent on a certain day for plowing and sowing and in fall for mowing and threshing. After long months of rest the machines of the central station were suddenly supposed to be in all villages at once. The unreliability of this arrangement is even more evident when climatic conditions demand the quickest possible execution of sowing and reaping. Within a few days the sprouting of the new seed can become decisive. The kernel can be laid into the black earth only when the rich humus is dry enough so that wagons and horses can drive over the field roads without getting stuck. But sowing must take place before the warm wind has dried out the ground. Again, at harvest time, one must take advantage of the proper moment. The grain must be sufficiently ripe but not over-ripe, otherwise it will drop out of the ears. This is the time when the German farmer goes to the field every day in order to test the ripeness of his grain. In the collective farm the idea is to be more progressive. There the agronomic supervisor of the distant MTS knows exactly when the grain at kolhosp XY has reached the proper firmness and when he can send forth his tractors and harvesters.

475 In 1935 there were 873 machine-tractor-stations in the entire Soviet Ukraine. In 1936 it was estimated that each /155/ MTS had 70 tractors, 16 mowing-threshing machines, 50 threshing machines, 15 traction engines, 15 motors and a crew of 400 men. The supervision of an MTS consists of a technical director, his political representative, a supervising agronomist - there

475 are eight agronomists all together working at an MTS - , the chief bookkeeper and the leading mechanic. These five comrades are the actual lords of the kolhosp of their district. The local leader of a kolhosp is merely the inspector who must follow the directions of the MTS and who all too often has no idea of how to run a farm.

474 475 As to what these large agricultural projects are like in practice, we have the following reports in the Soviet newspapers: The Communist Khar'kov) of January 8, 1939 announces that in the region of Dniepropetrovsk 82,211 doppelzentner of seed grain are lacking and that in the Khar'kov region 38.5% of the necessary seed is lacking. Visti (kiyev) of March 28, 1939, under the title of: "Sowing and not waiting for the ground to dry out", published the following report by its regional correspondent in Odessa: "After the bad weather field work has begun in the Odessa region. The sun and wind dry out the soil quickly, and the kolhosp of the southern districts of the region have begun sowing individual crops... The kolhosp of 'Spartakus' district have entered the contest in honor of the Eighteenth Plenary Assembly of the Communist Party, and are carrying on their spring sowing on a large scale. More than 1000 hectares of spring crops have already been sown in the district. Comrade Shlef and Comrade Wakker who run the tractors are performing 150% of the average of work per day. During the noon recess the kolhosp agitators help the members of the kolhosp study and memorize the speech of the leader of peoples, Stalin, delivered at the Eighteenth Congress of the Communist Party....But in spite of the present very favorable weather at present, not all the MTS of the Odessa region are ready to plant. In this region /156/ 112 tractors have not been repaired, 69 of which are caterpillar tractors. At the MTS of Andrei-Ivanov, for example, only one out of six caterpillar tractors is repaired; in the Ianiv MTS only one out of four;

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475 in the Vradiyiv MTS not one of three. As far as the supply of seed grain is concerned, all is not well. As a result of the inactivity and lack of management of the regional office for grain supplies, only 85% of the kolhosp are supplied with select grain. It is incomprehensible why there is a lack of seed grain precisely in those kolhosp that so industriously set about planting. Every day several dozen vehicles drive up to the grain provisioning center of Golovanevsk in order to exchange grain that is unsuitable for planting, and are forced to return without seed grain. In the granary at Golovanevsk there are 2000 doppelzentner of barley which for some reason is not cleaned. The precious spring days are wasted on trips to the elevator...The leaders of those rayons which have in part begun sowing fail to readjust the kolhosp immediately to field work... The MTS are not supplied with fuel quickly enough. As a result of an insufficient supply of fuel field work can come to a standstill even during the first few days of mass sowing. The leaders of the districts and rayons ought to head the contest for a superior Stalin-harvest in honor of the Eighteenth Party Congress of the Communist Party, in which the great masses of kolhosp have determined to take part."

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On June 7 and 8, 1939 a meeting of the active committee of the Communist Party of the Ukraine was held in Kiyev. Khrushchov, the first secretary of the Central Committee of the KPU stated that the harvest for this year promised to be a very good one, "but in the Bile Pole district only 18 out of 39 mowing-threshing machines were repaired, and the same was true of 19 out of 64 threshing machines and 2 out of 16 hauling machines. The situation in the /157/manufacture of sugar beets is alarming. The Odessa factory 'The Red

474 Signal' did not...deliver 100 threshing machines.
475 In the Chernigov region 70% of the necessary machine rakes are lacking; there is also a great lack of scythes... It is necessary to train 4000 persons in the handling of mowing-threshing machines, but the proper courses have not yet been organized..."

The "Sotsialistychna Zemlia" Number 114, 1939 complains: "Many kolhosp have no bags. The Storehouses in which the grain is to be kept are not rain-proof. In many kolhosp the repair of agricultural implements had to be suspended and in many others it could not even be begun because of the lack of forge coal. The shops have neither harnesses nor tar nor wagon-grease. In the region of Zhitomir only 160 out of 544 threshing machines were put into working order, and the same was true of only 143 out of 1475 motors." From the report of the representative of the Dnepropetrovsk region, Zadyonchenko, at the Eighteenth Congress of the Communist Party, "Izvestiia" of April 6, 1939 says that in 3000 kolhosp there are only 195 Communist organizations; that there were 8 repair shops for 66 MTS, which did not suffice to repair all broken-down tractors. We could fill a book with similar complaints taken from the Soviet press.

The beneficiary of the kolhosp is first of all the Muscovite state that takes as its share up to 25% of the estimated yield at a ridiculously low price. The MTS are paid in kind for their services. Of the rest of the harvest yield the seed grain and animal fodder are segregated and about 10 to 15% of the harvest is set aside as iron reserves, - before the First World War the cautious farmer always stored up the yield of an
474 entire harvest. Finally, the members of the kolhosp receive a certain annual share of provisions, aside from current provisions; what is left over is divided up in proportion to the number of days that have been worked. For some time now an

474 attempt has been made to increase the /158/comrades' interest in the kolhosp by means of prizes.

The most recent development of the Communist village group is characterized by the fact that the farmers tacitly divide up the collective land among themselves. Such a thing is possible only if the kolhosp officials and the village Soviets are in collusion, and if there are free acres besides the lands that are cultivated by the MTS. The Communist is January 29, 1939 confirms this development when it says that in the district of Shmerynka 145 farmers owned more animals than are permissible according to law, and 135 farmers more land than is allowed. The farmers work very industriously on their own land, whereas they neglect the collective farms. At the conference of the Central Committee of the KPU the law passed in April 1939, limiting the ownership of property of the collective farmers - "law against the waste of land" - was discussed, and it was noted that in many districts collective land was divided up. It was said that in this way private ownership of land had reappeared in hidden form. Finally the Visti of June 22, 1939 announced that the "regulation of peasant property" was to take place by November 15, 1939; "regulation", however, means a recent curtailment of peasant private ownership which had been permitted since 1934. This curtailment was also in the interests of the industrial section of Soviet economy, after many workers, mostly peasant sons, went back to their native villages from the industrial areas, because they found better living conditions there.

/159/ Coal, Ore, Petroleum, Workers

642 All the conditions which, according to the teachings of Karl Marx, ought to contribute to the happiness of the workers are fulfilled in the Soviet Union and therefore also in Soviet Ukraine.

16: Amer. Russ. Inst. (no date) 1950 RD1 Ukraine RD1

# CONSTITUTION

(Fundamental Law)

of the

UKRAINIAN

SOVIET SOCIALIST

REPUBLIC

of January 30, 1937

As amended through November 21, 1949

## Chapter I. The Social Structure

442 Art. 1. The Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic is a socialist state of workers and peasants.

Art. 2. The Soviets of Working People's Deputies which grew and attained strength as a result of the overthrow of the power of the landlords and capitalists, the setting up of the dictatorship of the proletariat, the liberation of the Ukrainian people from national oppression by Tsarism and by the Russian imperialist bourgeoisie and the defeat of the nationalist counter-revolution constitute the political foundation of the Ukrainian SSR.

Art. 3. In the Ukrainian SSR all power belongs to the working people of town and country as represented by the Soviets of Working People's Deputies.

471 Art. 4. The economic foundation of the Ukrainian SSR is the socialist system of economy and the socialist ownership of the means and instruments of production established as the result of the abolition of the capitalist system of economy, the abrogation of private ownership of the means and instruments of production and the elimination of the exploitation of man by man.

Art. 5. Socialist property in the Ukrainian SSR exists either in the form of State property (the possession of the whole people), or in the form of co-operative and collective farm property (the possession of collective farms or co-operative associations).

475 421 Art. 6. The land, its natural deposits, waters, forests, mills, factories, mines, rail, water and air transport, banks, communications, large State-organized agricultural enterprises (State farms, machine and tractor stations and the like), as well as municipal enterprises and the bulk of houses in the cities and industrial localities, are State property, that is belong to the whole people.

474 421 Art. 7. The common enterprises of collective farms and co-operative organizations with their livestock and implements, and the products of the collective farms and co-operative organizations, as well as their common buildings, constitute the common, socialist property of collective farms and co-operative organizations.

In addition to its basic income from the common collective farm enterprise, every household in a collective farm has for its personal use a small plot of household land and, as its personal property, a subsidiary husbandry on the plot, a dwelling house, livestock, poultry and minor agricultural implements — in accordance with the regulations of the agricultural artel.

[472]

[Ukrainian Constitution as of Nov. 21, 1949]



423 Art. 8. The land occupied by collective farms is secured to them free of charge
474 and for an unlimited time, that is, in perpetuity.

472 Art. 9. Alongside the socialist system of economy in the Ukrainian SSR the law permits the private economy of individual peasants and artisans based on their own work and precluding the exploitation of the labour of others.

421 Art. 10. The right of citizens to personal ownership of their incomes from work and of their savings, of their dwelling houses and subsidiary household economy, their household furniture and utensils, articles of personal use and convenience, as well as the right of inheritance of personal property of citizens, is protected by law.

185 Art. 11. The economic life of the Ukrainian SSR is determined and directed by
471 the State National Economic Plan with the aim of increasing the public wealth, of steadily improving the material and cultural level of the working people and of consolidating the independence of the socialist country and strengthening its defensive capacity.

Art. 12. In the Ukrainian SSR work is a duty and a matter of honour for every able-bodied citizen, in accordance with the principle: "He who does not work, neither shall he eat."

The principle applied in the Ukrainian SSR is that of socialism: "From each according to his ability, to each according to his work."

## Chapter II. The State Structure

642 Art. 13. For the purpose of mutual assistance among the Union Republics along economic and political lines, as well as along the line of defence, the Ukrainian SSR voluntarily united with the other equal Soviet Socialist Republics, namely:

The Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic,
The Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic,
The Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic,
The Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic,
The Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic,
The Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic,
The Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic,
The Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic,
The Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic,
The Kirghiz Soviet Socialist Republic,
The Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic,
The Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic,
The Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republic,
The Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic and
The Karelo-Finnish Soviet Socialist Republic

in a federal state, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Proceeding from the aforesaid, the Ukrainian SSR ensures to the USSR, as represented by its higher organs of state power and organs of state administration, the rights defined in Article 14 of the Constitution of the USSR.

Outside of the spheres set forth in Article 14 of the Constitution of the USSR, the Ukrainian SSR exercises state authority independently, retaining its sovereign rights in full.

## Agricultural Development of the Incorporated Territories

311 According to the Concise Yearbook of Poland, London, 1941, there
425 were in 1938 over four million hectares of arable land and 190,000
725 hectares of orchards and market gardens in Western Ukraine. The principal crops grown were wheat, rye, barley, oats, potatoes, and sugar beet.

Before 1939 farming in Western Ukraine was carried out on a very primitive level. After the incorporation of this region into the Ukrainian Republic, however, great changes were made. On October 28, 1939, the People's Assembly of Western Ukraine decreed the confiscation of large land estates, and subsequently, according to the Moscow periodical, Soviet State and Law (1941-III), over one million hectares were distributed among 400,000 landless farm workers and small holders. Similar changes occurred in the other incorporated territories. In the northern part of Bukovina, (in the Chernovitsy Province joined to the Ukraine) 200,000 hectares were distributed among landless workers, while in the Izmail (former Akkerman) Province, Bessarabia, 65,000 hectares were divided.

474 Apart from the confiscation of large estates and the re-distribution
241 of the land, two further processes could be observed in these areas
178 from the time of their incorporation until Germany attacked the U.S.S.R.: the organization of peasant holdings into collective farms, and the increased mechanization of agriculture. By September 1940 there were 400 collective farms in Western Ukraine; by January 1, 1941, the number had increased to 571, in which there were organized 34,000 peasant farm holdings. (These numbers do not include 535 "initiative" groups for the creation of collective farms with 14,000 peasant farm holdings.) In Northern Bukovina (according to the same source Soviet State and Law, 1941-III) the first seven collective farms with 3,000 hectares were also founded.

475 Mechanization also advanced rapidly. In the western part of the
407 Ukraine 170 Machine and Tractor Stations were established in the first year of incorporation into the Republic. In 1941 in the Izmail Province, 27 Machine Tractor Stations were being built, and in the Chernovitsy Province, 13.

475 In the Transcarpathian region (incorporated into the Ukraine in
407 June, 1945), nine Machine and Tractor Stations were established in
452 1946 to assist the work of the fields. The Five-Year Plan 1946-50 provides for special attention to the farms of Transcarpathian Ukraine in the form of machines, fertilizers and credits to increase agricultural production in this region, the pre-war output of which was as follows.

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439 which the kolkhoz members were permitted to keep[1] were performing this
438 task, furnishing the city markets with meat, dairy products, eggs,
472 poultry, vegetables, fruit, honey, mushrooms, and berries.

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474 In April 1940, in order to provide a wider incentive for the
kolkhoz members to increase their collective production, the system of
[442 delivery assessments was radically changed. Whereas the basis for
434] grain deliveries to the government had previously been the amount of
land sown, or, in the case of meat, milk, eggs and poultry, the size of
the herd or flock, the new basis for assessments was the amount of land
held by the kolkhoz; and any production above the fixed rates could be
retained by the kolkhoz for distribution among the members according
U to labour days.

461 A second decree applying to the Ukraine alone established supple-
●474 mentary pay for increasing the crop yield or productiveness in the
241 raising of livestock. This decree directed the collectives of the
446 Ukraine to assign various sections of the field or garden to work teams,
working to produce a fixed quota. If the production did not exceed
the quota, the members were paid only by the labour day; but if a team
produced above the quota, it received part of the excess as bonus.

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423 In 1934 the Soviet Government decided to permit individual members
of the kolkhozes to keep private farmsteads within the limits of ¼
to 1 hectare. A year later the code for the kolkhozes (called the
"Stalin Code") confirmed these rights. It also secured forever the
land held by the kolkhozes:

> "All boundaries formerly separating plots of land belonging to members of co-operatives are herby abolished, and all their holdings are pooled together to be used in common...the land occupied by the kolkhozes (as all land in the U.S.S.R.) is public government property. It is...secured to the kolkhozes for use without time limit, that is in perpetuity, and not subject to buying, selling or leasing to anyone by the co-operative... All agricultural production on kolkhoz land, shall be carried on by the members of the kolkhoz, jointly, co-operatively... Out of the land held in common a small part shall be set aside for the use of each household (for truck gardening, orchards, etc.)... The dimensions...may vary...from ¼ to ½ hectare and in certain regions up to one hectare".

1 [SIC-- ANALYST]

SU The State Farms (sovkhozes)

475 242 After the revolution, when the large holdings were broken up, a certain number of well-organized estates were preserved as model agricultural stations. These were subsequently turned into State Farms (sovkhozes), the purposes of which was to experiment with seed selection, plant and livestock breeding, fertilizers, etc. The sovkhozes, operating with hired labour, turned over to the government all their production above the requirements of the sovkhoz workers.

SU [407] To an even greater extent than the collective farms the State Farms were mechanized. They had the best technical equipment and, compared with the kolkhozes, twice the concentration of tractors per hectare. The sovkhoz workers received wages at specially worked out rates: they had the use of living quarters, dining rooms, and educational and entertainment facilities.

SU [433] The State Farms achieved good results in raising production, both of grain and of industrial crops.

SU 474 475 311 However, the basic form of agricultural organization in the U.S.S.R. continued to be the collective farms, which supplied the bulk of food and agricultural raw materials for industry.

372 At the beginning of the third Five Year Plan (1938), there were in the Soviet Union 242,000 collective farms (kolkhozes) embracing 91 per cent. of all the land under cultivation. The kolkhozes had 117.2 million hectares of arable land; the 3,960 State Farms (sovkhozes) had 12.4 million hectares;[1] and 1.5 million individual farmers had 900,000 hectares of arable land.[2]

U Collective Farms in the Ukraine

● 474 311 433 In 1938 the Ukraine contained almost one-ninth of the collective farms in the Soviet Union (27,393 out of 242,392). The total area occupied by the Ukrainian kolkhozes was 34.9 million hectares, of which about 61 per cent. was under cultivation. Like the kolkhozes in other Republics, the Ukrainian collectives made giant strides in the years between 1932-38: they increased in number, from 25,000 to 27,393; they increased their area of cultivation from 18.9 million to 21.4 million hectares;[3] but the greatest increase was in productivity, as the following table shows.

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1 Although the area of the sovkhozes extended to 68 million hectares, their sown acreage amounted to only 12.4 million hectares.

2 The Socialist Agricultural Economy of the U.S.S.R., Moscow, 1939

3 In the Ukraine as a whole, however, the cultivated area declined from 26.4 million hectares in 1932 to 25.6 million in 1938.

TABLE VII

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Average Yields of Grain on Ukrainian Collective Farms
(metric tons per hectare)

| | Ukraine Average pre-world war I 1901-13 | Ukrainian Collectives Average 1932-34 | 1937-39 | 1939 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Winter rye | 0.98 | 0.83 | 1.20 | 1.15 |
| Winter wheat | 1.04 | 0.93 | 1.43 | 1.59 |
| Summer wheat | 0.70 | 0.73 | 0.76 | 1.03 |
| Summer barley | 0.93 | 0.93 | 1.26 | 1.52 |
| Oats | 1.07 | 0.87 | 1.12 | 1.23 |
| Millet | 0.99 | 0.61 | 1.0 | 1.16 |
| Buckwheat | 0.68 | 0.50 | 0.58 | 1.50 |
| Maize | 1.11 | 0.93 | 1.5 | 1.57 |
| Average all grains | 0.91 | 0.85 | 1.23 | 1.36 |

Source: Speech delivered by N. Kruschev[1], Secretary General of the Communist Party of the Ukraine, cited in Agriculture in 1940, A. Martunov, Planned Economy, Moscow, 1940/II.

In the entire Soviet Union the average yield of grain crops increased from 0.7 tons per hectare in 1930 to 0.97 tons per hectare in 1938.

The development of agriculture in the collective farms of the Ukrainian S.S.R. from 1934-38 is further illustrated by the following table, which shows the area under cultivation, yield per hectare and gross output of the principal crops in 1938, all in percentages of 1934.

1 Now Premier of the Ukrainian S.S.R.

17: UNRRA G-4 (no date) 1947 RD1 Ukraine RD1
Soviet Union R1



TABLE VIII

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Productivity of Ukrainian Collective Farms in 1938
(expressed in percentage of 1934)

| | Area under cultivation | Yield per hectare | Gross output |
|---|---|---|---|
| Grain | 88.0 | 176.0 | 157 |
| Sugar beet | 98.0 | 164.0 | 161 |
| Sunflower | 89.0 | 208.0 | 171 |
| Flax | 126.0 | 140.0 | 290 |
| Cotton | 146.0 | 671.0 | 986 |

Source: J. Stetsenko "Productivity of Work in Collective Farms in the Ukrainian S.S.R." Planned Economy, Moscow, 1940/I.

As the table shows, the area under cultivation of grain, sugar beet, and sunflowers decreased somewhat; however, average yields per hectare and total production were increased by 75 to 100 per cent. This increase in productivity was brought about by improved cultivation methods: the use of selected seeds, chemical fertilizers, more scientific crop rotation and above all, by the greater mechanization of labour. As we have seen, the Ukraine had in 1938 nearly a thousand Machine and Tractor Stations, as compared with 657 in 1932. The effect of mechanization in the collectives is best shown by the fact that whereas in 1932 the M.T.S. cultivated 77.1 per cent. of the arable area of the Ukrainian kolkhozes, by 1937 they were serving 98.8 per cent. of the collectives' entire arable land.

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Since 1938 (the last year in which comprehensive agricultural statistics for the U.S.S.R. were published) there has been little information available about agricultural production in the Soviet Union. The figures which have been made public emerge from press or conference reports, and the information is usually very scanty. The immediate pre-war picture is therefore not clear.

We do have, however, the planned 1941 area of cultivation in the U.S.S.R., as well as the percentage of increase over 1940. From these figures we can estimate the sown areas in 1940, as the following tables show.

241 433 In comparing these figures with 1937 production the increases in the area of the Republic must be borne in mind.

## Effects of the War on Ukrainian Farming

727 241 474 When the German armies were finally driven out of the Ukraine in 1944 they left most of the Republic's farmsteads completely in ruins. So great was the devastation which they wrecked that even today the full extent of it is not definitely known. It has been estimated by Ukrainian officials, however, that the invaders ruined and plundered 27,110[1] of the Ukraine's collective farms and 872[1] of the state farms, burning the buildings and wrecking or stealing the machinery. The Germans also wrecked over 422,000 collective farm buildings and 423,000 privately owned farm buildings[2], scorched and laid waste millions of hectares of farm land, and destroyed 1,500[1] machine and tractor stations. The consequent losses of machinery were enormous. Fifty-six thousand tractors, 24,000 harvester combines, 30,200 trucks and automobiles used in farming and 1,892,000 other agricultural machines were destroyed or stolen by the Germans. The next table shows the losses compared with pre-war numbers.

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1 Statement by Mr. I.S. Senin, Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian S.S.R. at a meeting of the Deputy Foreign Ministers on February 7, 1947, published in Soviet News, London, February 8, 1947.

2 Department of UNRRA Supplies of the Ukrainian Government, Kiev, April 6, 1946.

## The Five-Year Plan in Ukrainian Agriculture

According to the Five-Year Plan 1946-50 the crop area of the Ukrainian S.S.R. in 1950 is to reach 30.5 million hectares, of which 21.3 million are to be planted on the collective farms. The distribution of major crops is planned as follows.

TABLE XIII

Ukraine: Crop Area in 1950 (Planned)
(hectares)

| | Total area | Including on the collective farms |
|---|---|---|
| Grain crops | 19,600,000 | 14,100,000 |
| Industrial crops | 2,600,000 | 2,200,000 |
| Melons, potatoes, and other vegetables | 2,800,000 | 1,000,000 |
| Fodder crops | 5,400,000 | 4,000,000 |

Source: The Five-Year Plan, 1946-50

The area sown to sugar beet in 1950 is fixed at 830,000 hectares, and to sunflower, 801,000 hectares. The hopfields are to be rehabilitated, and the area of vineyards growing European varieties of grapes is to be expanded. Measures are to be taken to drain 40,000 hectares and irrigate 30,000 hectares of farm land; and all engineering work needed to ensure normal production is to be restored.

Average yields of Ukrainian crops in 1950 are envisaged as follows: grain, 1.42 tons per hectare (compare 1939 average 1.36); flax, 0.42 tons; sugar beet, 19 tons; and potatoes, 11.2 tons per hectare.[1]

In the entire Soviet Union in 1950 the grain harvest is planned at 127 million tons, of which the Ukraine is to produce 27.8 million tons, or more than one-fifth. The Ukraine's sugar beet harvest is fixed at 15.7 million tons, representing over 60 per cent. of the sugar beet harvest of the U.S.S.R. in 1950. The production of potatoes is expected to be 23 million tons.

The following table compares these targets with pre-war production.

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1 Pravda Ukrainy, Kiev, August 28, 1946.

231 During the war these numbers were greatly reduced: the Germans killed, stole, or drove away 3.311 million horses, 7.594 million head of cattle, 9.335 million pigs, 7.317 million sheep, and over 59.379 million fowl of all kinds.[1]

231 727 474 The collective farms of the Republic suffered most heavily. After the German occupation the collective farms of the Ukraine were left with only 6.3 per cent. of their 1940 herds of cattle, 1.9 per cent. of their pigs, and 3.4 per cent. of their sheep. In practical terms, the Germans had almost completely wiped out collectively-owned livestock.

231 727 In rehabilitating their herds the collective farms have received much assistance from the Soviet Government and the fraternal Republics - Russia, Kazakhstan, Georgia and others - which have supplied **hundreds** of thousands of animals. However, the number of livestock in the kolkhozes are still far below pre-war. Most rapid steps were made in the re-stocking of cattle herds, which by early 1946 had reached 66 per cent. of the pre-war number of Ukrainian collective farms; pigs were 23 per cent. of pre-war and sheep and goats, 29 per cent. (Note: the figures in the two preceding paragraphs relate to collective farms alone.)[2]

The following table shows the pre-war numbers of livestock in the Ukraine (pre-1940 boundaries) and in the Soviet Union as a whole.

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1 Soviet Monitor, London, February 8, 1947.

2 Soviet Monitor, London, September 12, 1946.

231 In the first years after Western Ukraine was incorporated into the 474 Ukrainian S.S.R. there were built up in that region 285 cattle farms, 185 sheep farms, and 112 pig farms. By January 1, 1941, there was a total of 742 livestock farms in Western Ukraine alone.[1]

Bessarabia

231 There are no recent figures available for livestock in Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina; in 1935, however, it was estimated that these two regions contained three-quarters of a million cattle, as well as 611,000 pigs, 2,395,000 sheep, and 602,000 horses (a total of 4,340,000 cattle, sheep, pigs and horses).[2] We have no figures as to how much of this livestock was included in the provinces added to the Ukraine.

Ukrainian S.S.R. Livestock: the Five-Year Plan

231 By 1950, according to the Five-Year Plan, the number of horses in 195 the Ukraine should reach 2,629,000, a target which is 60 per cent. lower than the pre-war figure. To attain even this number, a great increase of horses must yet be made. In order partially to compensate, the Five-Year Plan has fixed a great increase in the number of oxen, so that the total number of oxen and horses together in 1950 will be five per cent. higher than before the war.

The following table shows the planned number of livestock in the Ukrainian S.S.R. by 1950.

TABLE XVII

Livestock in the Ukraine, 1950 (Planned)

| | Total | Included on the collective farms | Per cent. increase 1950 total over 1940 numbers |
|---|---|---|---|
| Cattle | 12,230,000 | 4,700,000 | 16 |
| Pigs | 9,600,000 | 3,300,000 | 7 |
| Sheep and goats | 6,780,000 | 3,100,000 | 8 |
| Horses | 2,629,000 | 1,363,000 | - 60[1] |

1 Decrease from 1941 figure.

Source: Pravda Ukrainy, Kiev, August 28, 1946.

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1 Soviet State and Law III, Moscow, 1941.

2 International Institute of Agriculture, Rome.

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TABLE XXVII

Ukraine: Prices of Rationed Food
(in roubles per kilogram)

| | Before October 1, 1946 | After October 1, 1946 | Percentage increase |
|---|---|---|---|
| Bread (black with rye) | 0.9 | 3.2 | 255 |
| Bread (whole wheat) | 1.8 | 6.0 | 240 |
| Meat tushonka | 16.6 | 32.0 | 87 |
| Pork in gravy | 20.5 | 35.3 | 72 |
| Meat and vegetables | 10.0 | 15.3 | 53 |
| Pork and rice | 15.7 | 30.7 | 90 |
| Meat and corn | 10.0 | 17.7 | 77 |
| Herrings in tomato sauce | 11.5 | 25.0 | 117 |
| Herrings in natural oil | 17.2 | 37.5 | 118 |
| Smoked cod | 9.8 | 18.0 | 84 |
| Lard | 18.0 | 36.0 | 100 |

Source: UNRRA Mission to the Ukraine, Kiev.

Public Markets

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The third kind of outlet for the distribution of food to the urban population is the public markets (officially called "Collective Farm Markets"). Their importance as a source of supplementary food is difficult generally to assess. On the one hand, extremely high prices plus the inconstancy or inadequacy of supplies prevent any group in the population from depending on the public markets for any substantial part of its diet; on the other hand, the variety of food sometimes available impels many to supplement the limited amounts and kinds of foods secured at the ration stores by purchases in the public markets. While prices are fixed and rigidly controlled in the ration stores, there is no control of prices whatever in the public markets, and the seller and purchaser usually agree on the price after a rather elaborate process of bargaining. On account of the limitations in supply, the selling prices are usually dear.

There are striking differences between the fixed, ration store prices and the uncontrolled market place prices. For example, in July 1946 (before ration prices were raised) white bread which - depending on the extraction rate of flour - was selling in ration stores at 90 kopecks[1] to 2.7 roubles a kilogram was selling in the public markets at 28.5 to

1 There are 160 kopecks to a rouble

TABLE XXVIII

Ukraine: Food Prices in a Typical Public Market
(in roubles)

| | June 1946 | July 1946 | January 1947 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Bread, kilo | 22.5 | 23.0 | 50.0 - 55.0 |
| Meat " | about 60.0 | 70 - 100 | 60.0 |
| Fish " | - | - | 65.0 |
| Milk, litre | 16.0 | 15.0 | 16.0 |
| Butter, kilo | 190.0 | 190.0 | 230.0 |
| Eggs, dozen | 42.0 | 48.0 | - |
| Cereals (various) kilo | - | 50.0 | - |
| Sugar | - | 100.0 | - |
| Vegetable oil | - | 200.0 | 200.0 |

- Very little or none on sale. Supplies vary greatly but are never very large.

Source: UNRRA Mission to the Ukraine, Kiev.

UNRRA Supplies and the Food Situation

Until the produce from local farms became available in the spring and summer of 1946, the diet of the urban population of the Ukraine depended principally, apart from bread, on UNRRA food supplies, which in the beginning consisted almost entirely of U.S. army rations, plus some dried and evaporated milk and tushonka. Urgently needed fats and oils were slow in arriving; up to May only 8,596 tons had been received in the Ukraine. The shortage was critical, since domestic production was providing a rate of only 4 to 5 kilograms of fats a year per person, as compared with 12.8 in 1940 and 22 kilograms in 1929.

Very little food was being received from other parts of the Soviet Union, and a protracted dry spell was threatening the 1946 harvest. Official rations for almost all categories of consumers were low;